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Abstract 
The Effect of Judicial Instructions on Jury Consideration 
of Defendant’s Refusal to Testify 
Victoria A. Zdrok 
Donald Bersoff, Ph.D 
 
 
 
 
This study investigated the effects of judicial instructions to disregard the 
defendant’s failure to testify on juridical consideration of the defendant’s silence. One 
hundred seventy nine actual jurors from the unused jury panels at the Philadelphia and 
Delaware courts watched one of the three versions of a two hour long condensed 
version of the actual trial. Trial versions differed in the strength of judicial instruction 
to disregard the defendant’s silence. As predicted, instructing the jurors to disregard 
the defendant’s silence resulted in greater conviction rate, consistent with the thought 
suppression and reactance literature. However, the conviction rate was not linearly 
related to the strength of the judicial instruction. It is hypothesized that other 
psychological factors, such as cognitive dissonance, may have contributed to this 
outcome. Jurors who rated defendant’s silence as an important factor in their verdict 
outcome were more likely to find the defendant guilty.  Results are discussed in light 
of the applicability of directed forgetting, thought suppression, belief perseverance and 
psychological reactance paradigms to the research on jury decision-making. 
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1.  Introduction 
Consciousness cannot produce a negation except in the form of consciousness of 
negation. (Sartre, 1956)  
 
In every jury trial, jurors are instructed to base their verdict exclusively on 
evidence presented in court through the sworn testimony of witnesses, admitted 
exhibits, and facts stipulated by the attorneys, and to disregard all facts not formally 
admitted into evidence. Many researchers have found, however, that jurors are biased 
by inadmissible testimony and other nonevidentiary factors despite receiving 
admonishments, legal explanations, or cautionary instructions to disregard. Moreover, 
several researchers have found that severe judicial admonishments often backfire. 
There are multiple factors that contribute to jurors’ difficulty in disregarding 
nonevidentiary factors. First, research in non-legal settings shows that people have 
difficulty forgetting a word or suppressing a thought or image upon instruction or 
volition. Second, a judge’s command to disregard the testimony calls attention to the 
testimony and may cause jurors to experience psychological reactance and to defy 
judge’s orders. 
In comparison with ample studies on the effect of inadmissible evidence, little 
research has been conducted on a related topic of biasing effects of the defendant’s 
choice to remain silent. A recent poll indicated that 40% of the potential jurors would 
draw a negative inference from the defendant’s refusal to testify (National Legal Aid 
and Defender Association, 1998). The goal of this project was to investigate whether 
cautionary judicial instructions affect jury’s perception of the defendant’s refusal to 
testify.  Based on the existing research on the effect of the inadmissible evidence as 
well as psychological theories outlined above it was hypothesized that judicial 
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instructions to disregard the defendant’s refusal to take the stand will produce a 
rebound effect leading to an increase in conviction rates.  
Because this topic has significant legal implications, it is important to provide a 
general understanding of the right to remain silent and the legal controversy that it 
generates. Starting with a brief overview of historical jury research and an exposition 
of the modern juridical trends, this paper then addresses the legal bases for the 
defendant’s right to remain silent.  It then analyzes the defendant’s choice to have the 
jury instructed to disregard his refusal to take the stand and a few exemplary appellate 
cases that have considered the implications of the defendant’s silence and opined on 
the effect of judicial instructions in overcoming jury bias.  
Following the legal overview, the cognitive theories on which the hypotheses 
are based will be summarized. Once the background theoretical framework of directed 
forgetting, belief perseverance, thought suppression and psychological reactance is 
introduced, this paper will proceed with an in-depth review of the studies focusing on 
the role of inadmissible evidence in jury decision-making, including a few studies that 
address, albeit on limited fashion, the issue of the defendant’s elected silence and 
judicial instructions to disregard it. 
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2.   Legal Background  
History of Trial by Jury 
The present day jury was not invented by a legislative body but resulted from 
centuries of slow evolution. In a work published in 1752, it was said that the jury’s  
“ . . . antiquity is beyond the reach of record of history”(Moore, 1973). The Athenians 
were the first people to come up with the idea of the jury, about 400 years before the 
time of Christ. The Athenian law was that those accused of wrongdoing should be 
allowed to argue their cases before a tribunal of their peers, who had as their duty not 
to interpret the law but to apply their understanding of “general justice”, or the 
conscience of the community (Guinther, 1988). The jurors, known as dicasts, were 
chosen by lot from males over the age of 30 numbering from 501 to 1501 in criminal 
cases and 201 in civil; the odd numbers were to guarantee a verdict by majority. Their 
verdict was final, although the loser had the right to bring a private suit against any 
witness he charged with perjury (Guinther, 1988).  Some scholars maintain that the 
modern jury evolved from early Scandinavian and German tribunals but no documents 
preceding the Norman invasion of England in 1066 make mention of juries (Hans & 
Vidmar, 1986). However, the roots of the jury can be traced back to the practice of 
compurgation conducted under old Anglo-Saxon law.  
Compurgators were twelve or more individuals summoned to bear witness to 
facts or to support the credibility of one of the parties. The compurgators’ role in the 
legal process was similar to today’s grand jury in that it served to confirm the validity 
of an accusation rather than to determine guilt. Guilt or innocence in criminal matters 
was determined by two methods: compurgator’s oath or the ordeal. If the accusation 
  
 
15 
 
did not involve a violent crime or there were no witnesses to the crime, the defendant 
would choose twelve or more compurgators (depending on the defendant’s reputation) 
to swear an oath about his or her credibility. If the required number of compurgators’ 
oaths were obtained, the defendant was found not guilty and freed (Hans & Vidmar, 
1986; Moore, 1973). 
However, if the accused person was not able to obtain a sufficient number of 
compugators, was charged with a violent crime, or had been caught in the act, the 
method of determining guilt or innocence was by the ordeal. Trial by ordeal took a 
number of forms. For example, the ordeal of fire required the accused to carry red-hot 
iron for a certain distance while the ordeal of hot water required the accused to pick a 
stone out of the boiling water. The injured hand was then wrapped and sealed.  If after 
three days following the ordeal, the bandaged hand had not become infected, the 
accused was judged to be innocent (Hans & Vidmar, 1986; Moore, 1973).   
Another form of settling legal disputes was trial by battle which was used 
mainly in civil cases. The two parties to the dispute (or “champions” hired by them) 
would fight on the battlefield and the winner of the battle won the legal case. The 
assumption underlying both trial by ordeal and trial by battle was that God would 
intervene on the side of the innocent person and decide an outcome of the case (Hans 
& Vidmar, 1986). 
During the 13th century the King’s justices begun to summon a jury to 
determine which  form of ordeal was to be used. In 1215 King John issued the Magna 
Carta which allowed an accused person to choose a trial by jury instead of submitting 
to the ordeal. However, unlike the present day jury, the medieval jurors were more 
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akin to witnesses than judges of fact. Their role was to provide the information about 
the facts or the involved parties on which the verdict was to be based (Hans & Vidmar, 
1986). Eventually the jurors began to be asked whether the facts warranted a verdict of 
guilty or not guilty, in addition to providing witness testimony. It was not until 1352 
that the English Parliament passed a statute allowing prospective jurors to be excluded 
on the ground that they had provided testimony leading to the indictment of the 
defendant. In addition, the practice of punishing jurors for bringing in what the court 
considered a wrongful verdict was also gradually discontinued. According to Simon & 
Marshall (1972), “by 1689 the jury in criminal cases, with its power to reject the 
Crown’s accusation, had evolved to such a point that its preservation was one of the 
main purposes of the English Declaration and Bill of Rights.”  The jury system 
reached American shores in 1607 when James I granted a charter to the Virginia 
Company and the Company established the community of Jamestown. The juries in 
the Virginia colony were composed of twelve men, and, when the case was given to 
the jury, it was locked up without food or water until it reached a verdict (Simon, 
1980). By the middle of the 18th century, the juries became finders of fact rather than 
providers of fact, similar in structure and functions to our contemporary jury (Hans & 
Vidmar, 1986; Moore, 1973).    
The modern American jury  
The right to a trial by jury is one of the cornerstones of the American 
democratic ethos. Article III of the U.S. Constitution grants constitutional protection 
of the right to trial by jury in criminal cases: “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases 
of Impeachment, shall be by Jury”.  The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 
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guarantees that “[n] o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . ..”  The 
Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a “speedy trial” by an “impartial jury of the 
State” in criminal prosecutions. Finally, the Seventh Amendment provides for a jury 
trial in all civil suits where the amount in controversy exceeds twenty dollars. In 
addition, the constitution of each state guarantees a trial by jury. American jurors have 
more power and discretion than jurors of any other country in the world. They play an 
important part in deciding whether the death penalty should be imposed on persons 
convicted of first-degree murder.  See Ring v. Arizona (2002)(Sixth Amendment 
requires jury, not judge, to decide on aggravating factors that allow for imposition of 
death penalty).  In addition, thirteen states allow juries to prescribe the length of 
sentence for the defendants convicted of noncapital crimes. 
 Unlike jurors in other countries, the American jurors may be questioned not 
only about their potential personal interest in a case but their general beliefs and 
prejudices as well. This pretrial questioning period, called the voir dire, is a routine 
part of every trial. Although in the vast majority of trials in the United States, 
attorneys’ questioning is quite limited, in some cases involving extensive pretrial 
publicity, the voir dire may take weeks or even months (Hans and Vidmar, 1986). The 
range of questions and their relevancy to the case varies widely depending upon 
discretion of the trial judge (Moore, 1973).  On the basis of prospective jurors’s 
responses to the questions, the judge may decide that they would have difficulty being 
fair and impartial, and may dismiss them with a challenge for cause. Challenges for 
cause are “designed to permit the exclusion of potential jurors who display actual bias 
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-- an acknowledged prejudicial state of mind -- or implied bias, presumed from the 
juror’s relationships or interests in ways specified by statute” (Winick, 1983). 
If attorneys feel that some of prospective jurors whom the judge does not 
dismiss for cause are likely to view their side unfavorably, they may use peremptory 
challenges to eliminate such persons from the jury. Peremptory challenges may be 
exercised without providing reasons but their number is limited (6-12) and it varies 
with the jurisdiction and the type of case (Hans & Vidmar, 1986). The rationale behind 
the peremptory challenges, as explained by famous English legal commentator in 
1766, is that a the defendant “should have a good opinion of his jury” and should not 
“be tried by any one man against whom he has conceived a prejudice, even without 
being able to assign a reason for his dislike” (Blackstone, 1769). However, if 
peremptory challenges are exercised in such a way as to eliminate members of certain 
race, gender, or class, some states allow the defendants to challenge such 
discriminatory practices if they can produce evidence of systematic exclusion (Hans & 
Vidmar, 1986).   
The defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent  
 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the individual 
from being compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case. The freedom of a 
the defendant in a criminal trial to remain silent "unless he chooses to speak in the 
unfettered exercise of his own will" (Malloy v. Hogan, 1964) is guaranteed by the 
Fifth Amendment and made applicable to state criminal proceedings through the 
Fourteenth. And the Constitution further guarantees that no adverse inferences are to 
be drawn from the exercise of that privilege (Litt, 1991). Under the framework of the 
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American criminal justice system, the State bears the full responsibility of proving the 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The objective of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination is to insure that an individual is not compelled, 
when acting as a witness, to give testimony that is likely to incriminate him (Litt, 
1991). The Fifth Amendment is predicated upon the assumption that innocent people 
might be convicted if forced to testify at their own trials and thus, the privilege 
includes the right to remain silent. Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment guarantees that 
neither the prosecution nor the court may insinuate that the jury should come to 
adverse conclusions based upon a defendant’s failure to testify (Gellis, 1981) 
The decision whether to put a criminal defendant on the stand or not is 
frequently the most crucial determination a defense attorney has to make as a part of 
his1 defense strategy.  When advising a client whether to testify, defense counsel 
weighs the impact a silent the defendant will have on the jury against the benefits and 
risks attendant to testifying. On the one hand, the defendant who testifies is able to put 
forth, in his own words, his version of the facts and to demonstrate his credibility as a 
witness. On the other hand, he risks that his appearance or mannerisms may prejudice 
the jury against him and that he may be subjected to the hazards of cross-examination 
and possible rebuttal by the prosecutor (Dieter, 1990). According to the rules of 
evidence, once the defendant testifies, he may be impeached by his prior conviction 
evidence. Without a defendant’s in-court testimony, such prior conviction evidence is 
likely to be excluded by the trial judge. Therefore, in any case involving a recidivistic 
defendant, putting him on the stand would lead to opening of Pandora’s box of his 
                                               
1 For the sake of simplicity, pronouns of male gender will be used to refer to individuals of either sex, 
unless the context requires otherwise.   
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prior convictions by the prosecution.  Not putting the defendant on the stand can be 
equally detrimental, bringing with it a high likelihood of negative inference drawn by 
the jury from the defendant’s refusal to tell his side of the story. Of course, the 
defendants may have reasons for not testifying that have nothing to do with this 
balancing process, as is the case with the defendants who decide not to testify because, 
in the words of Judge Stevens, they “prefer to risk a finding of guilt rather than being 
required to incriminate others whom they either love or fear”. (Lakeside v. Oregon, 
1978). Litt (1991) summed up a host of compelling reasons that might lead a the 
defendant to refuse testimony: 
  
“(1) he fears that his nervousness or appearance might prejudice the 
jury against him despite his innocence; (2) he desires that his prior 
criminal record not be brought to the jury’s attention; (3) he 
disapproves of the tribunal or of the accusations against him and does 
not want to participate in such proceedings; or (4) he does not want to 
reveal suspicious facts that might tend to incriminate his friends, 
family, or associates.”  
 
 
The recent national poll by the National Law Journal revealed that more than 
40 percent of potential jurors feel that the defendant’s failure to testify indicates that 
he is hiding something (National Legal Aid and Defender Association, 1998). They 
also reported to be quite comfortable ignoring a judge's instructions to the contrary. 
Three-fourths of those polled said it is the jury's job to "do the right thing," regardless 
of the judge's instructions. According to the past president of the National District 
Attorneys Association, prosecutors already knew this. "The Fifth Amendment is a very 
difficult pill to swallow for the layman," Staten Island District Attorney William 
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Murphy told the National Law Journal (Jurors' Outlook on Criminal Trials - A Survey 
(November 1998) National Law Journal, p. A25). 
A jury poll conducted in the United Kingdom in 1992, known as the Crown 
Court survey, yielded substantially similar results (Jackson, 1995). Thirty two percent 
of the jurors polled said that the judge had told them to disregard information of some 
kind or another. Eighty four percent reported that they understood why they had been 
told to disregard the information, and 68% said they had been able to disregard it. This 
left almost a third who admitted that they were not able to disregard the information 
given.  
The defendant’s right to request judicial instructions to disregard 
Following the decision to withhold the defendant’s testimony, the next 
important strategic decision a criminal defense attorney must make is whether to 
instruct the jury regarding the defendant’s constitutional right not to testify. The 
defendant is entitled to have the court instruct the jury that his silence must be 
disregarded and that it may not draw any inferences adverse to the defendant from the 
fact that he did not testify. The Pattern Jury Instructions promulgated by the Federal 
Judicial Center state that “a defendant has an absolute right not to testify.  The fact that 
defendant did not testify should not be considered by you in any way or even be 
discussed in your deliberations.” (Subcommittee on Pattern Jury Instructions of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, 1987, p. 
19). There are slight variations on the pattern instruction used in various circuits and 
states.  See Appendix E.   For example, the first circuit criminal jury instruction states 
that the defendant “has a constitutional right not to testify and no inference of guilt, or 
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of anything else, may be drawn from the fact that [the defendant] did not testify. For 
any of you to draw such an inference would be wrong; indeed, it would be a violation 
of your oath as a juror”. Most states and circuits interpret the leading case of Carter v. 
Kentucky (1981), as mandating aforementioned cautionary instructions to the jury. In 
some jurisdictions the instruction is required to be given as a matter of course unless 
the defendant objects to it (See Comment to Instruction 3.3, Manual of Model 
Criminal Jury Instructions, 2002). 
Appellate treatment of  issues related to instructions to disregard 
  There are two main issues that arise on appeal from the decisions involving 
judicial instructions to disregard. The first and more common issue involves judicial 
failure to include or sufficiently explain the ‘no adverse inference’ admonishment in 
the instructions to the jury, despite requests from the defendant’s council to do so. 
Such decisions are almost invariably reversed on appeal for violating the defendant’s 
Fifth Amendment right. The controlling case on this issue is Carter v. Kentucky, in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court described admonishment as a “powerful tool” that can 
“remove any influence of unspoken adverse inferences”.  The majority of decisions 
follow Carter’s line of reasoning.  A few judges, however, have described the practice 
of instructing the jury to disregard in more derogatory terms, as Judge Learned Hand, 
who described such admonitions as “recommendations to the jury of a mental 
gymnastic which is beyond not only their powers, but anybody’s else” (Nash v. United 
States, 1932, p. 1007); or the judge in Krulewitch v. United States (1949, p. 453), who 
characterized the practice as an “unmitigated fiction”; or the equally derogatory judge 
in United States v. Gruenwald (1956, p. 574), who castigated it as a “judicial placebo”.  
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As the court stated in Krulewitch (1949, p. 453), the practice of instructing a jury to 
disregard evidence is “an exorcising phrase intended to drive out evil spirits.” 
The other issue, which is of significantly greater relevance to the present study, 
is the appellate treatment of the defendant’s claim that judicial reiteration of the ‘no 
adverse inference’ instructions results in the rebound effect, further reminding the jury 
of the defendant’s failure to take the stand and leading to a greater bias. Such assertion 
finds actual support in the psychological literature reviewed below. However, no 
courts seemed to have agreed with appellants’ assertion that severe or repetitive 
judicial admonishment to disregard, aimed at eliminating the juror bias, may actually 
harm the defendant by producing a rebound effect. The case of Mengarelli v. United 
States Marshal (1973) is a prime example of an appellate response to the argument 
that judicial admonishment to disregard may backfire. In this case the district judge 
gave a standard instruction to the jury that “the law does not compel a the defendant in 
a criminal case to take the witness stand and testify, and no presumption of guilt may 
be raised and no inference of any kind may be drawn from the failure of a the 
defendant to testify."   Further, during the course of the charge to the jury the judge on 
six occasions instructed that "the law never imposes upon a the defendant in a criminal 
case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence."   No 
objection to this charge was interposed and no request was made that such instructions 
not be given. On appeal, the defendant contended that reiteration of the charge in this 
case amounted to impermissible comment by the trial court upon his failure to testify. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed, stating that:   
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The problem posed by the instruction is that it is a two-edged blade and 
that the jury in a particular case may react to either edge. Appellant 
would have us convert it into a one-edged blade and accept as matter of 
law the proposition that the more the charge is reiterated, the less 
attention the jurors will pay to it; that they will react more strongly to 
the fact that it is given at all, while paying no heed to the substance of 
that which is reiterated. We cannot accept this proposition. For all we 
know, in this case, reiteration may have been the only way to drive 
home to the jury the substance of the charge and to overcome the 
perhaps unforgettable fact that no defense had been tendered 
(Mengarelli v. United States, 1973, p. 619.) 
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3.   Psychological Background 
Contrary to the common belief of the legal profession and the judicial opinion 
expressed above, there is an ample empirical evidence demonstrating the difficulties 
people have ignoring or discounting information on command, blocking undesirable 
thoughts from entering consciousness or preventing unwanted information from 
influencing their judgments. Out of this evidence, there have been a number of 
theories that attempt to explain these difficulties in disregarding information on 
demand.  Some of these theories have been mentioned in prior jury research, and thus 
deserve consideration as possible explanations for the processes that take place in 
jurors’ minds when they are instructed to disregard a defendant’s failure to testify.  
While the present study was not designed to test the applicability of each of these 
theories, an understanding of juror behavior—and thus the predicted results of any 
particular jury instructions—requires an analysis of the relevant research in this area. 
Prior to the Freudian concept of the subconscious mind (Freud, 1915) and the 
experimental research on information processing, it was widely assumed that it is 
possible to control the content of one’s consciousness. In his extensive writings on the 
topic of mental avoidance, William James (1890) assumed that an unwanted cognition 
can be avoided by shifting one’s attention to another thought. He believed that in this 
way, people can regulate and control their stream of consciousness.  
In his analysis of cognition, Minsky (1985) addressed the complexities inherent 
in attempting to exert control over the content of our consciousness: 
 
All communities evolve some prohibitions and taboos to tell their 
members what they shouldn't do. That, too, must happen in our minds: 
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we accumulate memories to tell ourselves what we shouldn't think. But 
how could we make an agent to prevent us from doing something that, 
in the past, has led to bad or ineffectual results? Ideally, that agent 
would keep us from even thinking that bad idea again. But that seems 
almost paradoxical, like telling someone, "Don't think about a 
monkey!" (Minsky, 1985, p. 781). 
 
 
Minsky (1981) hypothesized two types of mental processes that attempt to 
keep unwanted contents from consciousness: suppressors and censors. Suppressors 
become active when an unwanted thought occurs and work to get us thinking some 
other more acceptable thought. After experience with avoiding certain thoughts, 
censors might be established. According to Minsky (1985), censors operate before an 
unwanted thought has entered consciousness by recognizing thoughts which often 
precede an unwanted thought and then directing our thoughts down another path. The 
work of censors occurs without the thought entering consciousness whereas 
suppressors are consciously initiated. It is the efficacy of the “suppressors” in filtering 
the unwanted information that has been of interest to memory researchers. Although 
Minsky does not validate his theories empirically, there are several well investigated 
experimental paradigms that focus on the ability of consciousness to regulate its 
contents: directed forgetting, thought suppression, belief perseverance and 
psychological reactance. All of these theories have been implicated in psychological 
research relevant to the jury’s ability to follow judicial instructions (Kassin & 
Studebaker, 1998). Each of these theories will be detailed below with a discussion of 
their potential applicability to the present study. After analyzing these psychological 
paradigms, the prior jury studies that refer to these phenomena will be evaluated in 
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light their ability to predict the effect of judicial instructions to disregard the 
defendant’s silence. 
Directed forgetting 
One of the most investigated memory theories that deal with subjects’ ability to 
disregard information on demand is the paradigm of direct forgetting.  The concept of 
a judicial instruction to disregard assumes the ability of a juror to forget relevant 
information, which appears at first glance to be supported by the directed forgetting 
studies.  Closer analysis of the directed forgetting methodology reveals, however, that 
it is not a likely predictor of behavior in a real courtroom. 
Directed forgetting refers to a phenomena whereby information designated to- 
be-forgotten is not remembered as well as information designated as to-be-
remembered.   According to MacLeod (1998) who provided a comprehensive review 
of the research on directed forgetting over the past 30 years, this phenomenon was 
alternatively called positive, voluntary, motivated, or intentional forgetting. Although 
a few earlier memory researchers described similar phenomena, it was the study by 
Bjork, LaBerge, and Legrand (1968) that established directed forgetting paradigm. The 
researchers presented subjects with 48 lists of digits with each list containing one or 
two target consonant strings (e.g., ADKL). Subjects were asked to name the digits and 
consonant targets, and then to recall them after each list. For some lists, subjects were 
warned just before the second consonant target that the first one could be forgotten. 
When both targets had to be remembered, only about 15% of second targets were 
recalled, whereas approximately 39% were recalled from lists with only one target. 
When the first of two could be forgotten, recall accuracy for the second was about 
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30%. Bjork et al. (1968) concluded that allowing people to forget the first of two items 
reduced the proactive interference on the second one, improving its recall. The 
researcher suggested that the case where the first item could be forgotten was more 
like that of a single item than of two items. They called their procedure “instructions to 
forget”. Following several other studies involving the directed forgetting paradigm, 
Bjork (1972) concluded that we often need to change the priority of information in 
memory, and that a mechanism like directed forgetting may be one of the tactics we 
use to do so.  
 Elmes (1969a) investigated effects of directed forgetting on short-term 
memory. Subjects were asked to study 12 lists where tests of some word pairs were 
interspersed with presentation of the other pairs. After either 8 out of 12 or 10 out of 
14 pairs, half of the subjects knew that they could disregard all prior pairs, and half did 
not. Although the subjects were not explicitly told to forget, subjects could trust the 
cue because the precue pairs were never tested. Contrary to Bjork et al. (1968), Elmes 
(1969a) reported no reliable recall advantage on a subsequent critical pair for the 
group that could forget earlier pairs compared to the group that could not forget them.  
In his subsequent experiment Elmes (1969b) manipulated the amount of 
information to be forgotten and the instructions to forget. Subjects studied 24 lists of 
seven or eight pairs. This time the cue to disregard was more obvious: instructing to 
forget either three, four, or five untested prior pairs. Elmes reported that the more 
explicit cue caused the stronger effect than in his prior study. He concluded that all 
items resided in short-term memory only as long as they were rehearsed, and that a cue 
to forget was basically a cue to discontinue rehearsal of the designated items, which 
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then were not transferred to long-term memory. After conducting additional studies 
replicating effects of the first two, Elmes and Wilkinson (1971) concluded that explicit 
use of the word “forget” seems to make a difference. They further suggested that the 
instruction to disregard has a differential impact upon recognition and recall. Because 
they obtained similar effects for relatively short as well as well as for longer lists, 
Elmes  et al(1971) concluded that the directed forgetting phenomenon is not limited to 
short-term memory. 
Contrary to the Elmes  et al. (1971) conclusion, Yinger and Johnson (1973) 
found that directed forgetting was limited to short-term retention intervals. In close 
replication of Bjork et al.’s (1968) procedure, Yinger and Johnson extended the 
retention interval, measuring the effect of the cue to forget at 6, 15, and 40 sec. They 
found a reliable directed-forgetting benefit at 6 sec and at 15 sec but no such 
difference after 40 sec. They attributed this to the distinction between short-term and 
long-term retention. 
In a more recent study, MacLeod (1989) conducted two experiments. In the 
first one, he instructed subjects to study a 96-word list. He then administered two tests 
of word recognition. In the explicit recognition test, subjects had to circle the 48 
studied words from among the 96 test words. The other test required subjects to 
complete word fragments with real words, with half of the 96 test words being the 
studied words. The two tests were administered twice, once immediately and once a 
week after study. The author found a strong difference between the to-be-forgotten and 
to-be-remembered words on the recognition tests. In the second experiment, subjects 
were administered  immediate tests of free recall and lexical decision subsequent to 
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studying 40 words. Both recall and lexical decision were far greater for the to-be-
remembered items than for the to-be-forgotten items and the unstudied words. The 
interpretation put forth was that both implicit and explicit tests were similarly affected 
by the inhibition of the to-be-forgotten words at the time of retrieval. 
The most important study was carried by Basden et al. (1993).  Basden et al. 
argued that the two usual directed forgetting methods (item and list) differ in terms of 
the mechanism that produces the difference between the items to be remembered and 
the items to be forgotten.  They argued that the item method led to selective rehearsal 
of the items to be remembered, whereas the list method led to inhibition of the items to 
be forgotten.  Although Basden et al. reported a series of experiments, they differed 
only in the strength of association of the studied items, so only experiment 2 will be 
discussed here.  Subjects studied a 16-word list that strongly associated with each 
other (such as “bread” and “butter”).  Under the item method, words were studied for 8 
seconds each with cues presented for the final 6 seconds indicating which words were 
to be forgotten and which were to be remembered.  Under the list method, each word 
was presented for 8 seconds; and subjects were told halfway through the list to forget 
the first 12 practice words.  They then did one of the four retention tests prior to recall 
tests. The results of this study showed that the item method had large effects on recall 
and some effect on recognition, while the list method produced smaller effects on 
recall and no effect on recognition. Based on the results, Basden et al. concluded that 
their hypothesis was entirely plausible:  the mechanism behind directed forgetting 
effect is inhibition for the list method, but is selective rehearsal for the item method.   
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In summary, there is a significant evidence for a directed-forgetting effect in 
short-term memory. If subjects are permitted or encouraged to cease thinking about an 
item, that item causes less interference on other items that the subject must remember. 
Although the to-be-forgotten items remain easily recognizable, they are poorly 
recalled  (MacLeod, 1998). 
Indeed, the directed forgetting paradigm has been mentioned in several studies 
examining jurors’ ability to disregard inadmissible evidence (see review by Kassin & 
Studebaker, 1998).  Upon closer analysis, however, the applicability of this paradigm 
to the present study appears questionable.  First, the directed forgetting paradigm is 
dependent on a series of artificial instructions that cannot be generalized from the 
laboratory to the courtroom.  Judicial instructions pertaining to defendant’s silence 
mandate jurors not to consider defendant’s refusal to testify, rather than to forget his 
silence and remember another fact as would be the case in a directed forgetting 
experiment.   Second, unlike the type of unrelated information that subjects are told to 
forget in directed forgetting experiments, the fact that defendant chose not to speak in 
his defense is inextricably connected in the minds of the jurors to the evidence in the 
case. Third, contrary to the directed forgetting experiment in which the to-be-forgotten 
information is new to the subjects, the judicial instructions are given upon termination 
of the trial prior to the deliberation at which point defendant’s refusal to take the stand 
is not a novel fact but a missing piece of the puzzle that jurors expect to receive. 
Finally, instead of asking the subjects to forget some items and remember others, 
judicial instructions to disregard direct jurors not to pay attention to defendant’s 
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silence, which more closely resemble the thought suppression instructions discussed 
below. 
Thought suppression  
Another body of pertinent research deals with the paradoxical effects of 
thought suppression.  Thought suppression, or directed conscious avoidance or 
inattention is a concept similar to directed forgetting.  The main distinction between 
the two theories is that thought suppression, derived from psychoanalytic theory, 
attempts to explain how and with what effect people go about the conscious task of 
discounting a thought. Originally suggested by one of Freud’s fundamental insights 
(1915), suppression is a process related to repression. The conscious aspect of the 
suppression makes it different from repression, which has largely been considered an 
unconscious process (Freud, 1915). Whereas repression implies that the thought may 
be permanently inaccessible, suppression suggests a temporary absence of that thought 
from consciousness.  
   Laboratory experimentation on thought suppression was pioneered by Daniel 
Wegner (1987).  According to Wegner et al. (1987), thought suppression is a two-step 
process. The authors postulate that “to suppress a thought  requires that one (a) plan to 
suppress a thought  and (b) carry out that plan by suppressing all manifestations of the 
thought, including the original plan” (Wegner et al., 1987). To test their hypothesis, 
Wegner at al. (1987), asked 34 undergraduate subjects in the first experiment and 54 in 
the second to try not to think of a white bear as the subjects reported their thoughts 
aloud. The subjects were instructed to ring a bell when the thought of a white bear 
entered their mind.  Although subjects regularly voiced a plan to distract themselves 
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and made reports that revealed intervals of successful absorption in other things, they 
were incapable of sustaining suppression for very long. Moreover, on being asked 
after the suppression task to think about the white bear for a 5-min period, these 
subjects reported significantly more tokens of thoughts about the bear than did the 
subjects in the control group who were asked to think about the white bear from the 
outset. The authors suggested that attempted thought suppression has a paradoxical 
rebound effect producing the very preoccupation that it is directed against. 
Subsequent research examined the relation between thought suppression and 
affect.  Wenzlaff, Wegner, and Ropert (1988) asked normal and depressed subjects not 
to think about stories that conveyed either a highly positive or negative event. The 
thought protocols showed that depressives dialed in suppressing negative thoughts. A 
similar result was obtained in a study by Conway, Howell, and Giannopoulos (1991). 
The authors asked undergraduates not to think about “success” or “failure” feedback 
regarding their test performance. The results indicated that during the suppression 
period, depressed subjects had significantly more intrusions about failure. 
Wenzlaff, Wegner, and Klein (1991) further investigated the relationship 
between thought suppression and affect. They hypothesized that suppression of a 
thought bonds thought and mood, such that later occurrences of the same mood 
promote the return of the suppressed thought, and vice versa. During an initial 
suppression or expression period, subjects were exposed to music that influenced 
mood in either positive or negative direction. During a subsequent expression period, 
participants listened to the same music they heard initially, or the opposite mood 
music. The results supported the authors’ theory that suppression creates a strong bond 
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between suppressed thoughts and their associated moods. When the mood of the music 
was the same during initial suppression and subsequent expression, there was a 
particularly strong rebound effect of the thought.  
To explain the post-suppression rebound, Wegner and Erber (1992) proposed a 
two component model of thought suppression. The first component is a controlled 
distracter search. The distracter search is intentional and under conscious control, 
allowing the participant to redirect attention from the unwanted thought to selected 
distracters. This component demands processing resources, and it can be compromised 
when other demands are placed on the processing system. The second component, the 
automatic target search, is an unconscious mechanism that monitors the status of 
consciousness. The purpose of this mechanism is to ensure that the unwanted material 
has not reentered consciousness. Inadvertently, through its periodic checking, the 
automatic target search keeps the unwanted material activated and readily accessible to 
conscious awareness. Though this mechanism is thought to be intentionally initiated, it 
operates outside of consciousness and is unaffected by limited processing capacity. 
The automatic target search may be what makes thought suppression difficult. While 
checking to see if the unwanted thought has entered awareness, this mechanism keeps 
the thought activated. At the same time, the controlled distracter search must work to 
draw attention away from the unwanted thought. If something interferes with the 
distracter search, the unwanted thought is then more likely to enter awareness (Wegner 
and Erber, 1992). 
Wegner and Erber (1992) tested this hypothesis by comparing accessibility of 
suppressed thoughts with the accessibility of thoughts on which subjects were 
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consciously trying to concentrate. In their first experiment, 56 undergraduates were 
asked to make associations to word prompts as they tried to suppress thinking about a 
target word (e.g., house) or tried to concentrate on that word. In the low time pressure 
condition, subjects had ten seconds to respond with an associated word while in the 
high time pressure condition they had only three seconds. Under the cognitive load 
imposed by time pressure, subjects gave the target word in response to target-related 
prompts (e.g., home) more often during suppression than during concentration. In the 
second experiment, 46 undergraduates were asked to think or not to think about one of 
the target words used in the study while performing a two-color reaction time Stroop 
task (color naming). The stimulus word set used in the Stroop task contained some of 
target words. Half of the subjects carried out this task while simultaneously rehearsing 
a 9-digit (high cognitive load condition) while remainder did it while rehearsing a 1-
digit number (low cognitive load condition). The reaction times for naming colors 
were found to be greater under conditions of cognitive load when subjects were asked 
to suppress thinking of the word than under conditions of no cognitive load or when 
subjects were asked to concentrate on the word.  The suppression increased 
accessibility of an unwanted thought in that color-naming responses for that thought 
were slowed during an imposed cognitive load.  
In their subsequent investigation of thought and mood, Wegner, Erber and 
Zanakos (1993) added cognitive load during thought suppression. Subjects were told 
to think of an event that was sad but not to feel sad. Participants who had to rehearse a 
9-digit number or participate in a Stroop task (color naming) produced greater rebound 
effects than participants who did not have a cognitive load.   
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Wegner and his colleagues also explored the effect of  environment on thought 
suppression. Wegner, Schneider, Knutson , and MacMahon (1991) showed that 
suppressed thoughts may be associated with environmental distractors. Participants 
who initially suppressed thinking about a white bear during a slide show had a greater 
rebound when the subsequent expression period was in the same context as the 
suppression. In addition, Wegner and Erber (1993) showed that suppressed thoughts 
were more readily produced as associates in a word association task when the task 
involved timed constraint, and that these thoughts interfered in a Stroop task. 
The Wegner theory was also examined by other researchers.  Macrae, 
Bodenhausen, Milne, and Jetten (1994) investigated thought suppression related to 
stereotypes. Subjects were shown a picture of a skinhead and asked to write a 
description of his typical day while suppressing any stereotypical thoughts about the 
skinhead. After this task, all of the participants were then shown a new picture of a 
skinhead followed by the same writing task but with no suppression instructions. After 
the content of the stories were scored for stereotypicality, the results were lower for 
picture 1 and higher after picture 2, showing a rebound effect. In comparison, subjects 
given no suppression instruction scored the same on both writing tasks. 
Kelly and Kahn (1994) posited a differential impact of thought suppression 
depending on the type of material to be forgotten. The authors had people suppress 
their own intrusive thoughts or other thoughts (such as a white bear). They found no 
rebound effect for personal intrusive thoughts, suggesting that people have more 
control suppressing their own thoughts, rather than those supplied by experimenter. 
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Although personal thoughts may be easier to suppress, the effectiveness of 
suppression may depend upon the thought content. Wegner, Shortt, Blake, and Page 
(1990) found that suppression of exciting thoughts intensifies the excitement. The 
authors instructed subjects either to think or not to think about the exciting topic of sex 
or one of three unexciting topics (such as dancing). The length of the suppression 
period was varied in three different experiments from 3 to 30 minutes. During the 
expression or suppression periods, skin conductance level of the subjects was 
measured. Results showed that the suppression of the exciting thought led to increases 
in skin conductance level. Wegner, Lane, and Dimitri (1994) found similar results. 
Using survey data, the authors showed that if a person ruminated about someone they 
loved in the past and these feelings were kept secret or suppressed, it was more likely 
to have been the target of obsessive preoccupation. 
Since the pioneering work of Wegner (1987) on the paradoxical effects of 
thought suppression, over 30 more studies have documented immediate enhancement 
and rebound effects of thought suppression (see Rassin et al, 2000). In sum, results of 
these experiments confirm that the intention to suppress a thought creates the opposite 
of what is wanted, and that is particularly true when cognitive or emotional resources 
are assigned elsewhere when the attempted suppression is ongoing. This has direct 
implications on jurors ‘ability to follow judicial directions to disregard defendant’s 
silence. Jurors’ attempts to suppress their thoughts related to defendant’s failure to 
speak in his defense while simultaneously attempting to process the evidence in the 
case (imposed cognitive load) are likely to result in increased thinking about the 
defendant’s silence, quite contrary to the intent of the judicial instructions.   
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Although instructions to suppress thoughts resemble the judicial instructions to 
disregard, thought suppression procedure is not a perfect model for the procedure of 
jury deliberation. Although the subjects in the thought suppression experiments are 
asked to report the intrusions of the suppressed thought, jurors are not required to 
monitor and report their thought process for the intrusion of the thoughts pertaining to 
the defendant’s silence. In addition, while the thought supplied in the thought 
suppression experiments is unrelated to any other thoughts, the instruction not to 
consider defendant’s silence is closely related to the very decision making the jury is 
called upon to perform, i.e  to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant by 
weighing the evidence of the case. 
Comparison of directed forgetting and thought suppression paradigms 
Because in some respects directed forgetting research seems to contradict 
literature on thought suppression, it is important to highlight the differences between 
the two experimental paradigms in order to understand hypotheses of the current 
study. 
In directed forgetting studies, some participants are instructed to forget 
previously learned material, and are subsequently unable to recall as many items as 
participants who were instructed to remember the same material. Thus, directed 
forgetting can be considered a successful method of control over the thought content. 
A thought suppression experiment typically consists of two phases, an expression 
phase, where subjects are asked to think about a particular subject, and a suppression 
phase, where participants are asked to suppress thoughts about a particular subject. As 
the studies above indicate, the thought suppression is not only ineffective but may 
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result in a post-suppression rebound effect. The precise differences between the two 
paradigms have not been researched (Rassin et al., 2000) with only one masters’ thesis 
study comparing the two experiments (Whetstone and Cross, 1998; unpublished 
except in the internet journal). 
Whetstone and Cross (1998) provided a convenient summary of procedural 
differences between the directed forgetting and thought suppression paradigms: 
 
Table 1.   Comparison of directed forgetting and thought suppression procedures. 
 
 Directed Forgetting  Thought Suppression  
Study  forget group studies List 1  
initial suppression group told 
what to suppress  
Forget/Suppress  
forget group tries to forget 
initial List 1 and study List 2  
suppression group engages in 
thought suppression  
Test  
forget group tested for recall 
and recalls fewer List 1 words 
than remember group  
initial suppression group 
engages in concentration on 
target thought and reports it 
more often than initial 
expression group  
 
 
Both directed forgetting and thought suppression paradigms instruct subjects to 
disregard certain thoughts, but in thought suppression experiments subjects are also 
asked to report intrusions of the forbidden thoughts into awareness. Whetstone and 
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Cross (1998) compared the two paradigms by adding a condition to the typical 
directed forgetting experiment that instructed subjects to report intrusions. They found 
that directed forgetting did not occur when participants tried to forget a word but also 
had to report intrusions. Whetstone and Cross (1998) raise the question as to whether 
paradoxical effects of thought suppression result not from the instruction to suppress 
but from the instructions to report intrusions, and suggest this area to be a fertile 
ground for future research. 
Rassin et al. (2000) also emphasized the important technical differences 
between directed forgetting and thought suppression paradigms. He noted that, in 
directed forgetting experiments, the forget-list is presented as a practice task that 
precedes the real memory task. The typical instructions in the directed forgetting 
experiment are as follows: “What have you done so far has been practice. You can 
forget about those words. I will now show you the actual set of test words.” (Rassin et 
al, 2000, citing Myers, 1998). On the other hand, the typical instructions in the 
suppression experiment are more like: “I want you not to think about the word I have 
just shown you”. Thus, in directing forgetting studies, subjects are allowed to ignore 
the to-be-forgotten information, while they concentrate on subsequently presented to-
be-remembered information. The subsequent information becomes a strong distracter 
trivializing the to-be-forgotten information. In contrast, in thought suppression studies, 
the to-be-suppressed thought is made more salient by the very act of presenting it as 
the target for suppression, while no distractor is provided. According to Rassin et al. 
(2000), the consequence of isolating the thought as the target for suppression while 
providing no alternative thought to distract the subjects is that “subjects attend to a 
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large array of environmental stimuli that become retrieval cues of the to-be-suppressed 
thought”. Rassin et al. (2000) suggest that the thought suppression paradigm is “more 
ecologically valid as a model for real life obsessive intrusions” and has more everyday 
equivalents than does directed forgetting. 
The premise for the hypothesis of the current study is that the courtroom 
environment and the defendant whose conduct is the focus of the jurors’ attention 
become the retrieval cues for the to-be-suppressed thoughts relating to defendant’ 
silence. Thus, the courtroom setting is dissimilar to the directed forgetting experiment 
in that it not only fails to provide distractors but also requires the subjects to focus on 
and consider the actions of the very defendant whose silence they are supposed to 
ignore. In that way, it closely parallels the thought suppression experiment (except 
jurors are not required to report intrusions of the suppressed thoughts). 
Belief perseverance  
Another paradigm that has been implicated in the studies of jury consideration 
of evidence is the theory of belief perseverance. Belief perseverance refers to the 
tendency for people’s beliefs to persist even after all the evidence from which they 
were derived has been discredited. Early research on information processing 
documented that people often have difficulties ignoring (or discounting) a piece of 
information once they have learned it, even if they later discover that it is completely 
unreliable or invalid. In the words of Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975, p. 880): 
“What is done is done and cannot be undone”.  
Belief perseverance was initially studied in the context of debriefing. In the 
Ross et al (1975) study, participants were given false feedback about whether they had 
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succeeded or failed on a novel discrimination task. Following the task, they were 
debriefed about the nature of the feedback. Then the participants were asked to 
estimate past and future performance on this task. Results indicated a substantial 
perseverance of initial impressions of performance following debriefing.  
Ross, Lepper, Strack & Steinmetz (1977) replicated the earlier study by Ross et 
al (1975). This time they asked subjects to identify potential antecedents to explain 
events in various contexts (such as hit-and-run accidents). Results confirmed belief 
perseverance effect, showing that participants were affected by previous information, 
even if they knew from the outset that the event to be explained was hypothetical. The 
researchers concluded that when people encode presented information, they construct 
causal links between the to-be-ignored and the to-be-used information. This integrative 
coding then impairs successful discounting of invalid information. 
Anderson, Lepper and Ross (1980) presented subjects with case studies 
suggesting that the best fire fighters are either risk takers or cautious types. Subjects 
were also asked to generate an explanation for this correlation. Subsequently, subjects 
were told that the information they were given was totally false and fabricated solely 
for the study. Despite this debriefing, subjects continued to maintain their newly 
created beliefs about risk-taking and fire-fighting ability. This tendency for the beliefs 
to persevere was replicated in a wide range of studies (e.g., Anderson & Sechler, 1986; 
Schul & Burnstein, 1985; Johnson & Seifert, 1994). 
This effect was clarified in later research by Bjork (1989) and McLeod (1989) 
suggesting that because the to-be-used information is integrated simultaneously with 
the to-be-ignored information, the former now contains meanings and connotations 
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consistent with the latter. Even if individuals initially succeed in blocking the direct 
impact of an invalid report, they are often unable to undo the special connotations it 
gave to the valid information (Bjork, 1989; MacLeod, 1989).  
Further research has confirmed that the residual meaning of the to-be-ignored 
information may remain in the form of subtle changes in the to-be-used information 
(Schul & Burnstein, 1985; Wyer & Budesheim, 1987). The impact of integrative 
coding is so robust that even when warning is given that the impending piece of 
information may be false it still does not affect the perception of its invalidity (Gilbert, 
Krull, and Malone, 1990) and does not enable individuals to discount the invalid 
information more successfully in making judgments, unless individuals are 
subsequently reminded about the prior warning at the time they process the 
information (Schul, 1993).   
In Schul’s study (1993), one hundred and sixty undergraduates were asked to 
read a booklet containing information about a stimulus person containing eight varying 
descriptors. Prior to reading, subjects in the warning condition were instructed that not 
all the descriptors would pertain to the stimulus person. All subjects were then 
instructed to form a vivid image of the person based on the eight descriptor set. 
Subjects in the discounting conditions were then told to ignore certain descriptors as 
not pertaining to the stimulus person. The final instruction was to make a series of 
judgments about the stimulus person. For each judgmental statement, subjects were 
asked to indicate how certain they were on a 9-point Likert scale that the statement fits 
the stimulus person.  The results suggested that warning by itself was not sufficient to 
induce successful discounting, but when people were reminded of the warning at  the 
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time they encoded the information, discounting was facilitated. Subsequent 
experiments in this study replicated the importance of pairing the warning with the 
reminder, and showed that once reminded about the warning, people take more time to 
process the to-be-ignored information. 
Discounting of information has also been studied in the context of impression 
formation. Golding, Fowler, Long, and Latta (1990) investigated the effect of explicit 
cues on the formation of the beliefs and memories for to-be-disregarded information. 
Golding et al. presented a scenario in which an individual was instructed to disregard 
some information but this instruction was followed by the fact that the information 
was either “confidential” or “incorrect”. The researchers hypothesized that in the 
“confidential” case the listener would continue to process the “irrelevant” information, 
whereas the “incorrect” information would not be further processed. This would lead 
to the confidential information affecting the judgments more and being recalled better 
than the incorrect information. As predicted, the authors found that confidential 
information affected belief formation more than the incorrect information. However, 
there was no difference in recall of information: the to-be-disregarded information was 
recalled relatively well regardless of the type of disregard instruction.  
The belief perseverance effect has been studied in the area of conditional 
admissibility of evidence.  Although conditional admissibility is not an issue in the 
current study, these studies demonstrated that belief in a proposition can persist despite 
the complete negation of a piece of evidence that initially gave rise to the belief 
(Nisbett and Ross, 1980).  They suggested that “biased assimilation” of a piece of later 
discredited evidence continues to affect jurors’ perception of other evidence by 
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inducing other thought processes to perpetuate belief in the original proposition for 
which the discredited evidence was introduced.  Nisbett and Ross (1980) distinguished 
an earlier study (Hatvany, Strack & Ross, 1979, as cited in Nisbett and Ross, 1980) in 
which this effect was not found by theorizing that the mental processes involved in 
belief perseverance need time to take hold and that when the information is discredited 
too rapidly, the belief may not persevere. 
The research on belief perseverance is generally consistent with that on thought 
suppression in that instructions to disregard are either not heeded at all or are only 
partially heeded. Only in very limited contexts, such as when information was 
designated as “incorrect” (Golding et al., 1990) the instructions to disregard produced 
the intended effect. In light of the research on belief perseverance, Kassin and 
Studebaker (1998)  suggested that judicial instructions to disregard may fail “when the 
discredited information has already activated the formation of a theory or explanatory 
structure”. 
The literature on belief perseverance has an important implication for the 
present study. In the actual trial which was used to create the trial stimulus for the 
present study, the judge told the jury that there were alternative, innocuous reasons 
which may underlie defendant’s decision not to take the stand (i.e., extreme shyness, 
stuttering, quivering voice, etc) to encourage jurors to keep an open mind. But if the 
juror has already concluded during the course of the trial (or during the closing 
arguments) that the defendant’s failure to testify is due to concealment of 
incriminating information or an inability to refute the alleged crime, it already 
activated the “formation of a theory or explanatory structure” (Kassin & Studebaker, 
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1998) which will then persevere notwithstanding the instructions to disregard his 
silence or consider alternatives.   It is unclear in the case of a defendant’s failure to 
testify whether there is adequate time for a belief to be formed prior to the giving of 
the instruction to disregard that belief.  Consistent with Nisbett and Ross’ (1980) 
observations, when the jury does not learn that defendant will not testify until the end 
of trial, there may be insufficient time for the “explanatory structure” to be formed 
prior to the giving of the instruction. 
In addition, the belief perseverance experiments differ from the courtroom 
environment in that jurors are always admonished at the inception of the trial and at 
every recess that they must keep an open mind and refrain from reaching any 
conclusions until all of the evidence has been presented and they have been instructed 
by the court. Although the jurors may consciously attempt to follow their solemn 
promise to keep an open mind, they may be subconsciously forming beliefs which will 
then persevere despite disconfirming evidence and judicial instructions to disregard. 
Psychological reactance 
 The final theory applicable to the present study is that of psychological 
reactance. Reactance refers to the negative reactions individuals experience when they 
feel that someone is trying to limit their personal freedom. Research findings suggest 
that whenever subjects perceive a threat to their ability to make personal choices, they 
tend to shift in a direction exactly opposite to that being urged upon them – an effect 
known as the negative attitude change, or reactance (Brehm, 1966; Rhodewalt & 
Davidson, 1983). Brehm was the first researcher to demonstrate that the desire to resist 
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undue influence may be so strong that in some cases individuals shift away from a 
view being advocated even if it is one they might normally espouse. 
 Brehm’s theory is based on the premise that each person believes herself 
possessed of a set of “free behaviors” in which she could realistically engage, either at 
present or in the future. According to the theory, a threat to any of these behaviors 
would generate a motivational state aimed at recapturing the freedoms affected and 
preventing the loss of others. The intensity of this reactance state would be a direct 
function of the magnitude of the threat, the number of free behaviors jeopardized, and 
the value placed on them by the individual.  Freedoms could either be directly 
removed or threatened, or their peril implied in what happens to other freedoms 
(Brehm, 1966).  
 Brehm (1966) further suggested that reactance plays a role in augmenting the 
attractiveness of a threatened or eliminated freedom, and this effect is not diminished 
by the comparative appeal of other freedoms.  A threat to freedom stimulates 
reactance, leading to an increased desire for the endangered freedom and attempts to 
exercise it. 
Reactance also generates attempts to protect the choice not to do something. 
Encouraging a person to do something, which he may already feel free to do, may 
actually result in the individual refusing to comply, according to Brehm (1966). This 
reactance effect may occur not only with regard to behaviors, but also in the arena of 
opinions and attitudes. A compelling effort at attitude change may meet with 
resistance, even if the recipient of the effort agrees in essence with the communication. 
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…to the extent that it is perceived by the individual that the  
  communicator is trying to make him change, his freedom to  
  decide for himself will be threatened and he will experience 
reactance….Information and arguments can be quite helpful to the 
individual and may result in positive influence, but the perception 
  that the communicator is attempting to influence will tend to be seen 
  as a threat to one’s freedom to decide for oneself (Brehm, 1966, p. 7). 
 
 
 The original reactance theory was later elaborated by Brehm and Brehm (1981) 
to include the relationship between reactance theory and the concept of control. 
Control, by their definition, is “the ability to affect the probability of occurrence of a 
potential outcome…to the extent that one has this ability, one has a freedom…”. If 
something deprives one of control, freedom is threatened. This definition of ‘control’ 
is equivalent to that of ‘freedom’ as used in the original reactance theory.   
 The theory of psychological reactance has received considerable attention 
within the field of mental health as it applies to patient noncompliance and resistance 
to psychotherapy (e.g., Horvath and Coheen, 1990; Dowd, 1993; Carver, 1991). 
Reactance has also been tested and demonstrated in a variety of situations involving, 
in the words of Brehm (1966), “multifarious freedoms of daily living”, such as 
restroom graffiti (Pennebaker  & Sanders, 1976), petition signing (Heilman, 1976), 
group coercion (Gamson, Fireman, & Rytina, 1982), reading speeches aloud (Worchel, 
S., & Brehm, J, 1984), attraction to members of opposite sex (Pennebaker, Dyer, 
Caulkins, Litowitz, Ackerman, Anderson, & McGraw, 1979), felt competence and 
attitude change (Wicklund & Brehm, 1968), and impression formation (Brehm & 
Cole, 1966). 
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 More recent research replicated the reactance effects found in several of the 
earlier studies mentioned above. In an impression formation and attitude change study 
(Wright, 1986), 56 undergraduates who previously expressed either partial or full 
agreement with an attitudinal position were exposed to a low- or high-threat essay 
advocating the position. Anonymous postcommunication measures of opinion 
indicated a reactance effect (negative attitude change) only for subjects who read the 
high-threat essay and previously expressed complete agreement with the 
communicator. Relative to low-threat subjects, high-threat subjects felt more pressured 
by the essay, viewed its author as less sincere, and described the essay as more 
forceful and less organized. The authors explain findings in terms of an exercise of 
freedom, and argue that impression management cannot account for between-group 
differences in attitude change.  
A more recent study by Wright, Wadley, Danner and Phillips (1992) confirmed 
earlier findings by Pennebaker et al. (1979). Researchers exposed 21 female 
undergraduates to an opinion statement that threatened to a greater or lesser degree 
their freedom to make an independent assessment of the relative attractiveness of two 
men. Subjects exposed to the mild statement indicated a persuasion effect on the 
measures of perceived attractiveness and choice, while subjects exposed to the strong 
statement showed contrary opinions indicative of reactance.  
Reactance effects were also noted in individuals’ responses to aggressive 
measures or highly charged messages affecting their health-related practices such as 
drinking and smoking. Thus, Engs and Hanson (1989) tested the prediction, based on 
reactance theory, that attempting to prevent alcohol consumption among underage 
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college students (aged less than 21 years) creates reactance motivation and leads to 
increased drinking among such students. In a national sample of 3,375 undergraduates 
surveyed during the 1987-1988 academic year, significantly more underage than legal-
age subjects were found to drink, counter to the pattern documented by research 
extending back to the early 1950s. Authors posit that findings support reactance theory 
and suggest that raising the legal drinking age in the United States may have 
contributed to increased drinking among underage students through the arousal of 
reactance motivation. 
Similarly, aggressive attempts at dissuasion highly reactant individuals from 
smoking may backfire, as suggested by Graybar, Antonuccio, Boutilier, & Varble 
(1989). Investigators exposed 104 male veteran smokers to either high or low amounts 
of physician advice to quit smoking. The advice was delivered in either a positive or 
negative tone. The study used a 2 x 2 x 2 (reactance by amount by tone) factorial 
design with reported cigarette consumption among several dependent measures. 
Authors found a significant interaction between the subjects’ level of reactance and the 
tone of physician advice. Scores on the Therapeutic Reactance Scale revealed that, for 
subjects high in behavioral reactance, a low amount of negatively toned advice was 
most effective in facilitating a reduction in smoking. Conversely, for subjects low in 
behavioral reactance, a high amount of either negatively or positively toned advice 
was most effective in promoting a reduction in smoking. 
 Recent studies by Kelly and Nauta (1997) reveal interactive effects between 
reactance and thought suppression. Two studies, with 87 and 114 college students 
serving as subjects respectively, explored whether dispositional reactance moderates 
  
 
51 
 
the effects of thought suppression. Subjects were assigned to either a higher or a lower 
reactant group based on their scores on the measure of reactance and instructed either 
to suppress or to express their own intrusive thoughts during a stream-of-
consciousness writing task. Results revealed that among higher reactant participants, 
those in the suppression group subsequently reported feeling more out of control of 
and disturbed by their intrusive thoughts and by their thoughts in general than did 
those in the expression group. Among the lower reactant participants, this pattern was 
reversed: those in the expression group reported feeling more out of control of their 
thoughts than did those in the suppression group. The authors suggest that being 
motivated to restore one's freedom may 
paradoxically leave one feeling more out of control of one's thoughts after suppressing 
them.  
 The theory of reactance is of major significance for the hypothesis of the 
present study. Judicial instructions to disregard are likely to endanger juror’s freedom 
to consider what they might deem important to the verdict, therefore, triggering 
reactant non-compliance. Because voir dire is unable to measure reactance, and 
identify and exclude highly reactant individuals, there is a reasonable likelihood than 
any given jury would contain some highly reactant individuals, unable to comply with 
judicial instructions. In addition, the study by Kelly and Nauta (1997) discussed above 
suggests an interactive effect between reactance and thought suppression whereby a 
high degree of reactance may amplify the paradoxical effect of thought suppression. 
 Theories of directed forgetting, thought suppression, belief perseverance, and 
psychological reactance were widely investigated in the psycholegal arena, specifically 
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in the studies addressing the effect of judicial instructions mandating the jury to 
disregard nonevidentiary factors. Two types of studies address juror’s ability to 
disregard evidence: those that deal specifically with inadmissible evidence and those 
that examine the effect of related non-evidentiary factors such as pretrial publicity and 
presumptuous cross-examination questions. The studies dealing with juror’s ability to 
disregard inadmissible evidence bear direct relation to the present research topic and 
will be discussed below; discussion of the studies on pretrial publicity is outside the 
scope of this paper. 
Jurors’ ability to disregard inadmissible evidence  
 Although some of the earlier research has shown that judicial instructions can 
be effective and can serve the purpose for which they were intended (Cornish & Sealy, 
1973; Mitchell & Byrne, 1973; Simon, 1966; Miller, 1975), most of the recent 
research in this area suggest the opposite (Hans & Doob, 1976; Wolf  & Montgomery, 
1977).  
The effect of inadmissible evidence on jury verdicts was found to be 
insignificant in the earliest study by Sue, Smith, and Caldwell (1973). In that study 
mock jurors read a four-page summary of a murder case. The critical evidence was 
supplied by detectives who had tape-recorded incriminating statements made by the 
defendant in a telephone conversation with a suspect in an unrelated investigation. 
Because the detectives had received permission to wire tap only to gather evidence in 
an unrelated investigation, the defense objected to the use of the tape recording against 
the defendant charged with murder. In different conditions, the judge ruled that the 
evidence was either admissible or inadmissible. The results showed that when the case 
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against the defendant was weak, subjects used inadmissible evidence but when the 
case against the defendant was strong, inadmissible evidence was not used. The 
percentage of guilty verdicts was the same regardless of whether the critical evidence 
was ruled admissible or inadmissible.  
Another study that found no juror bias following exposure to inadmissible 
evidence was conducted by Miller (1975). In that study, subjects drawn from a jury 
pool viewed 4-hour videotaped simulations of a complex civil trial in which the 
amount of inadmissible evidence presented was varied from zero to six pieces. No 
differences were found among jurors in the seven conditions in either verdict or 
amount of award, indicating that the inadmissible evidence did not influence juror 
decisions. 
Likewise, researchers conducting the London School of Economics Jury 
Project (Cornish & Sealy, 1973; hereinafter “the L.S.E. Project”) found that 
inadmissible evidence did not bias juror’s verdicts in a rape case (although it did bias 
their verdict in a theft case as described below). In that project British simulated jurors 
listened to a tape recording of edited trial transcripts from a rape case and a theft case. 
Evidence of a previous rape conviction did not influence subject’s verdicts when it 
was ruled inadmissible, though it had considerable impact when admissible.  
However, the rest of the studies demonstrated that simulated jurors often fail to 
disregard specific pieces of information when instructed to do so.  
 In the L.S.E. Project (1973) mentioned above, subjects who learned about the 
defendant’s prior conviction for a similar crime but were instructed by the judge to 
disregard it were more likely to convict the defendant than subjects who did not hear 
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that bit of inadmissible evidence (that bias was only found in a theft case, but not in a 
rape case). In one of the earlier studies, subjects drawn from actual jury pools listened 
to a tape recording of a simulated murder trial after being exposed either to prejudicial 
newspaper clippings describing the defendant’s criminal background and retracted 
confession or to nonprejudicial clippings.  
Despite judicial instructions to decide the case only on the basis of the 
admissible evidence, presented in court, juries exposed to the prejudicial clippings 
were subsequently more likely to find the defendant guilty (Padawer-Singer & Barton, 
1975). Similar findings have been reported in several other early studies (Doob & 
Kirshenbaum, 1972; Hoiberg & Stires, 1973; Sue, Smith, & Gilbert, 1974). 
Whereas some studies indicate that instructions to disregard have no effect on 
juries, other research suggests that instructions to disregard may even backfire, 
producing the paradoxical “boomerang” effect. One of the earlier studies to 
investigate the effect of limiting judicial instructions on the jury was discussed in the 
landmark University of Chicago Jury Study (Broeder, 1959, discussed in Kalven & 
Zeisel, 1966). The researchers submitted three different trials to over 100 juries made 
up of persons who had actually been summoned for jury service.  Each jury heard a 
tape recording of a mock trial based upon the facts of an actual case. In one version of 
the case, the defendant reveals that he has no insurance but no objection or further 
comment is made; the average jury award  in these cases was $33,000. In a second 
version, the defendant reveals that he has insurance, but again there is no objection or 
comment; the average award here was $37,000. Finally, in a version in which 
insurance is mentioned by the defendant, an objection is made, and the jury is 
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subsequently instructed to disregard the evidence, the average award was $46,000.  
These results clearly indicated that the judge’s admonishment backfired by drawing 
jurors’ attention to the insurance disclosure, heightening its salience and subsequent 
accessibility in memory, and possibly arousing psychological reactance. 
  Applying Brehm’s reactance theory described above, Wolf and Montgomery 
(1977) tested the hypothesis that jurors perceive the instructions to disregard as  “a 
threat to their freedom to consider all of the available evidence”. The critical evidence, 
obtained through a stakeout, favored either the prosecution or the defense. In addition, 
the judge either ruled it admissible, ruled it inadmissible, or ruled it inadmissible and 
“admonished” the jurors to disregard it by telling them that the evidence “must play no 
role in your consideration of the case. You have no choice but to disregard it”. In a 
control condition, the critical evidence was not presented. The results indicated that 
the inadmissible evidence did not significantly affect guilt judgments unless the judge 
issued the admonishment. The authors concluded that this finding that curative 
instructions can ‘backfire” supports the reactance hypothesis. 
 Like, Wolf and Montgomery (1977), Thompson, Fong and Rosenhan (1981) 
manipulated the judge’s curative instructions. The researchers found that verdicts of 
simulated jurors were biased by proacquittal  inadmissible evidence but were not 
biased by proconviction inadmissible evidence. In that study 288 mock jurors were 
asked to watch videotapes of a realistic simulated trial to and to render verdicts as 
individuals before deliberation and as groups after deliberation. The trial evidence and 
judge’s instructions were varied. The trial versions contained inadmissible evidence 
supporting conviction, inadmissible evidence supporting acquittal or no inadmissible 
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evidence. The judge’s instructions emphasized the importance either of protecting the 
defendant’s due process rights or of reaching an accurate verdict. The researchers 
found that jurors who received proacquittal evidence were less likely to convict than 
those who received either proconviction evidence or no inadmissible evidence. This 
finding was consistent with authors’ hypothesis that jurors are less willing to ignore 
vindicating than incriminating  inadmissible evidence. The variations of the judge’s 
instructions had no effect on the verdict. Paradoxically, jurors who received  
proconviction inadmissible evidence thought that their verdicts had been  influenced 
by it, whereas those who received proacquittal inadmissible evidence thought that their 
verdicts had not been influenced by it. 
 Pickel (1995) conducted three experiments investigating mock jurors’ ability to 
disregard inadmissible prior conviction evidence and hearsay. In Experiments 1 and 2, 
college students listened to an audiotape enacting a theft trial. The critical evidence 
favored the prosecution and was objected to by the defense. In three different 
conditions the judge either ruled the evidence admissible, ruled it inadmissible, or 
ruled  inadmissible and explained the legal basis for the ruling. In a fourth condition, 
no critical evidence was presented. The critical witness’s credibility was also 
manipulated. With prior conviction evidence but not hearsay evidence the legal 
explanation “backfired”. This finding, the authors noted, parallels Wolf and 
Montgomery’s (1977) result that a judge’s admonishment to disregard evidence may 
backfire.  In addition, the critical witness’ credibility did not affect subjects’ ability to 
disregard inadmissible evidence. In the third Experiment, subjects rated on a 9-point 
scale their opinion of whether it would be fair for the jury to be allowed to use one of 
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six evidence items favoring the prosecution. The results suggested that the legal 
explanation may affect the use of hearsay and prior conviction evidence differently 
because of subjects’ dissimilar preconceptions of the fairness of using the two 
evidence items to assess guilt.   
 Jurors’ selective compliance with instructions to disregard inadmissible 
evidence was also investigated in the recent study by Kassin and Sommers (1997).  
The investigators  asked 81 jurors to read a murder trial summary in which a wiretap 
was ruled admissible, inadmissible because it was not reliable, or inadmissible because 
it was illegally obtained. Consistent with the authors’ hypothesis, participants were 
more likely to vote guilty and interpret subsequent evidence as more incriminating in 
the admissible and inadmissible/due process conditions than in the 
admissible/unreliable and control groups. Jurors discounted evidence when it was 
ruled inadmissible because it lacked credibility but not when it was excluded because 
it violated due process. These results indicated that jurors might be influenced not by 
the judge’s ruling per se but by the causal basis for that ruling. 
 Results of the study by Kassin and Sommers (1997) can be extended to the 
current research question. Jurors’ selective compliance suggests that jurors are less 
likely to discount the defendant’s refusal to testify than many other non-evidentiary 
factors because the instruction to disregard stems from due process as opposed to 
reliability grounds. 
Jurors’ perception of the defendant’s refusal to testify 
 Although many studies addressed jurors’ consideration of inadmissible 
evidence, few of them extended their inquiry to the related topic of extralegal 
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evidence, jurors’ perception of the defendant’s refusal to testify. Two dissertations 
have touched upon this topic. The first one, by Martha Schilling (1983) was a field 
survey study focusing on the jury’s perception of the defendant controlling for the 
variables of the defendant testimony, jury verdict, and severity of crime. Schilling 
administered a written survey soliciting both objective and subjective information 
from 116 real jurors from criminal felony trials in Wyoming and Colorado. The 
subjective data were collected at the conclusion of each trial using an original semantic 
differential instrument consisting of 20 bipolar adjective scales. The objective 
information included charge, verdict, and the defendant’s testimony added at the end 
of the semantic differential form.  
The results suggested that jurors perceive criminal defendants along moral and 
mental health dimensions with moral being more important of the two. The defendants 
who testified at their own trials were seen more favorably, i.e., had significantly higher 
moral and mental health scores, than the defendants who did not testify. Other findings 
indicated that verdict interacted significantly with testimony on the moral factor; 
however, there was no main effect on verdict. The author concluded that although the 
defendant’s decision not to testify was negatively perceived by the jury when the jury 
was judging the defendant’s moral character, his character was not of critical 
importance when the jury decided on the verdict. 
Schilling’s dissertation study had many limitations inherent in doing a field 
survey research. Random sampling or assignment was not used because of the legal 
constraints prohibiting experimental intrusion into the trial process, difficulty of 
receiving approval from the judges and compelling real jurors to respond to the 
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survey. There was no control group, instead, judge’s responses at every trial served as 
a basis for a comparison group. Moreover, there was no objective data to which juror’s 
self-report information could be compared.   
The effects of the defendant’s refusal to testify were also examined in a 
dissertation study by Johnson (1983).  Johnson asked 355 college students from 6 
different universities to read a mock trial. The goal of his study was to investigate the 
effects of 5 variables within the same basic case:  refusal to testify, high or low 
occupational status, presence of one of 2 types of prior convictions or a clean record, 
effectiveness of judge’s instructions to ignore prior convictions, and subjects’ level of 
authoritarianism.  At the end of the mock trial summary subjects were asked for a 
verdict and their confidence in that verdict. Subjects were then told to assume that the 
defendant was guilty and asked to assign a prison sentence and a fine.  
Results of the study indicated that the 5 independent variables had little 
relationship to subjects’ decision-making when the defendant had no prior conviction. 
The one significant result in the no-prior conditions was that subjects preferred a lesser 
sentence when the defendant chose to take the stand. 
On the contrary, taking the stand to testify in one’s own behalf with a prior 
conviction increased the defendant’s chance of being convicted. High authoritarians 
convicted the defendants more than low authoritarians when there were no judicial 
instructions, when the defendant testified in his own behalf. The author concluded, in 
relevant part, that it makes no difference whether the defendant takes the stand or not 
when the jury determines his guilt or innocence, however, once the defendant is found 
guilty he will receive a greater sentence if he failed to testify. There was no effect of 
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judicial limiting instructions on the subjects’ ability to disregard the defendant’s prior 
conviction for purposes of determining guilt. 
Although the study attempted to investigate jurors’ perceptions of the 
defendant’s refusal to take the stand and their ability to comply with judge’s 
instructions to disregard the defendant’s prior conviction evidence, it did not address 
the effect of judicial instructions to disregard the defendant’s refusal to testify which 
would have been the logical extension of the study.  Because the main focus of the 
study seemed to have been the interaction of authoritarianism with other factors, the 
author did not vary curative judicial instructions.  Other shortcomings of Johnson’s 
study included use of college students, which jeopardized the external validity of his 
sample, inclusion of too many experimental variables which tends to reduce the main 
effect and confound comprehension and generalization of experimental analyses. 
Moreover, the case synopsis used by Johnson (1983) was not calibrated to detect the 
impact of the defendant’s refusal to testify. Few jurors would convict the defendant 
who presented evidence that unquestionably established his innocence just because he 
didn’t take the stand. In the synopsis used in Johnson’s study, the State’s case was 
very weak and little or no information was withheld from the jury by the defendant’s 
refusal to testify. On the other hand, if the State’s case were very strong, the defendant 
would have probably been convicted whether he testified or not. It is when the 
evidence against the defendant reaches the point of uncertainty and it is not clear 
whether the defendant is innocent or guilty, jurors may search for additional clues as to 
the defendant’s guilt or innocence.  
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Methodological concerns involving simulated jury research 
That ‘point of uncertainty’ was first noted by Kalven and Zeisel (1966) in their 
landmark Chicago Jury Project. The authors suggested that in cases where the 
evidence is evenly distributed or ambiguous, “juror sentiments”, such as pre-existing 
attitudes and personality variables are more likely to affect jurors’ decisions. In other 
words, when the evidence is evenly balanced, the jurors feel “liberated” to respond to 
non-evidentiary factors. This effect, termed the “liberation hypothesis”, was confirmed 
by subsequent research (Reskin and Visher, 1986; Werner, Kagehiro and Strube, 1982; 
Ugwuegbu, 1978). In their review of research affecting jury decisionmaking, Hans and 
Vidmar (1986) also confirmed  that when the evidence was clear, the jury was inclined 
to follow the law, but when it was unclear, ambiguous or contradictory, “jurors felt 
liberated to give rein to their own sense of justice and equity”. 
 For the present study, the trial stimulus was specifically chosen on the basis of 
its ambiguity. Not only it was selected because it had a ‘hung jury’ outcome (usually 
indicating a degree of evidence ambiguity), it was then further calibrated to ensure 
equal distribution of evidence.  In addition to the trial defense attorney, two other 
criminal defense counsels were consulted to confirm the ambiguity and insure the 
balance of defense and prosecution evidence. 
However, choosing ambiguous cases in keeping with the liberation hypothesis 
has  been criticized by various researchers. Thus, Dawes (1993) argued that 
deliberately choosing cases that are ambiguous is not the best way of studying jury 
decisions. Drawing comparisons to the field of clinical psychology, he indicated that “. 
. . the Rorschach blots were deliberately chosen to be  ambiguous, under the 
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assumption that the ways in which the subjects structured such visual ambiguity would 
be  representative of the way in which they structure the ambiguity in their ‘worlds’ . . 
. . In fact, the few enduring characteristics of Rorschach responses that appear to 
predict anything are those concerning the ‘quality’ of the responses, which can be 
assessed only by assuming that certain blots do correspond better for some people than 
for others” and are not ambiguous. 
The differing methodologies used in simulated jury research are often 
criticized as poorly generalizable to the real courtroom (Miller et al., 1983; Bray & 
Kerr, 1982; Hans & Vidmar, 1982; Elwork & Sales, 1980; Weiten & Diamond, 1979). 
The trial stimuli used, such as short trial transcripts, written summaries or mock trials, 
are often very concise and overly simplified. Sometimes the trial stimuli include 
specific references to the variables being studied, which unduly draws subjects’ 
attention to them (MacCoun, 1989). The wide range of settings (from the courtroom to 
the classroom) used for simulated trials has also been criticized (Bray and Kerr, 1982).    
In an attempt to address aforementioned concerns, the most effective and 
realistic (although costly) trial stimulus was selected. The trial stimulus is based on a 
slightly abbreviated and modified actual trial which was staged and videotaped by a 
professional  production company in a mock courtroom. The videotape is 
approximately 2 hours long. To meet the external validity challenge, subjects were 
drawn from the actual jury pool. 
Another criticism levied at existing jury studies is that they frequently do not 
take into account jury deliberations.  In the real world, all jury verdicts are group 
decisions in which the individual psychological reactions of jurors may be affected by 
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group interaction and discussion.  Bray and Kerr (1982) found that only 52% of the 
jury studies they catalogued in 1982 included deliberations in the study design; and 
this ratio seems to persist in more recent research.  This may be due to researchers’ 
reliance on Kalven and Zeisel’s (1966) contention that “with very few exceptions the 
first ballot decides the outcome of the verdict.  And if this is true, the real decision is 
often made before the deliberation begins.”  The research results underlying Kalven 
and Zeisel’s  (1966) conclusions were that in approximately 90% of the cases they 
examined, the final verdict was the same as the majority vote on the first ballot; 
however, they seem not to have controlled for the type of case, strength of the 
evidence on each side, or other factors which may have made deliberations more 
robust in other cases. 
To overcome these objections, the methodology used in this study included 
both an individual verdict phase and a subsequent deliberation phase whereby the 
subjects’ verdicts could be compared pre- and post-deliberation.  Moreover, the care 
taken to balance the evidence as between prosecution and defense and the insertion of 
“questionable” evidence such as the single bullet found in the defendant’s shirt pocket 
by the arresting officer should improve the likelihood of robust deliberations. 
However, even the most realistic trial stimulus, such as the one designed in 
present study, cannot meet all the challenges presented by critics of simulated jury 
research.  Kadane (1993) argued that “the procedure of grabbing a sample of 
experimental subjects and exposing them to a single, abbreviated case in a laboratory 
lacks ecological validity.” He suggested that the complexity of events that occur once 
the trial begins cannot be successfully replicated in a simulated jury experiment. 
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According to Kadane, mock jurors watching an abbreviated trial are not subjected to 
the strategic presentation of arguments and information by the attorneys. Attorneys 
design the manner in which they present the evidence to appeal to the particular jurors 
with whom they are familiar with after the voir dire. They frame their arguments 
differently depending on which jurors they think will be able to influence other jurors.  
Kadane argued that “this introduces a complex reflective cycle of decisions by the 
attorney conditioned on the nature of the jurors, conditioned on the attorney’s juror 
selection strategies, and so on. For the social scientist researcher, it means a stimulus 
case is not a stimulus case independent of the jurors to whom the case is presented” 
(1993). 
Unfortunately, the only way to fulfill Kadane’s criteria of the ecologically 
valid study is to conduct an experimental trial from start to finish using real jury pool, 
real courtroom, real indictment, and, preferably, a real defendant. Such an experiment 
would not only be prohibitively expensive and procedurally impractical but it would 
raise serious ethical and constitutional issues as well.  
Moreover, even a true experiment may not be sufficient to meet the rigorous 
criticism of Dawes (1993). Dawes (1993) criticized the use of a single trial stimulus 
and a limited predictor instead of multiple cases and multiple indicators. To increase 
external validity he suggested that “a large number of subjects respond to multiple 
attitudinal items and then reach verdicts on many trials presented in as much detail as 
possible” (Dawes, 1993). However, he conceded that such methodology would cause 
substantial problems in allocating experimenter’s efforts and subjects’ time. 
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Many jury studies have also been criticized for using inappropriate dependent 
measures (Bray & Noble, 1982; Weiten & Diamond, 1979). These studies utilize 
probability of guilt ratings or sentencing rather than verdict as a dependent measure, 
despite the fact that only some states allow jurors to be involved in sentencing. This is 
done in order to use more powerful statistical tests which do not accept nominal 
variables such as verdict (Kerlinger, 1973). 
In keeping with Kerlinger’s observations, both dichotomous verdict and 
continuous guilt and sentencing variables were utilized in the current study permitting 
use of both non-parametric and parametric measures. 
Summary of backgrounds and rationale for present study 
Defendant’s right to remain silent is one of the primary constitutional rights in 
American jurisprudence. Courts have traditionally protected this right by giving a 
specific judicial instruction to the jury to disregard the defendant’s failure to testify in 
reaching their verdict. The typical instruction given advises the jury that defendant has 
the right to remain silent and abstain from testifying in his defense and directs jurors 
not to draw any adverse inference from defendant’s failure to take the stand in 
considering his guilt or innocence.  The option to request such an instruction belongs 
to defendant, and each criminal defense attorney whose client elects to remain silent 
must make a choice as to whether to request that instruction. Most defense attorneys 
do request this instruction, as they believe that jurors would otherwise draw an adverse 
inference from defendant’s silence. Both attorneys and courts apparently believe that 
this curative judicial instruction is effective in dissipating the negative implications of 
defendant’s failure to testify. 
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On the other hand, psychological literature suggests that jurors may have 
difficulty disregarding such an important fact as defendant’s failure to personally deny 
the charges against him. There are four bodies of psychological literature that have 
potential implication to people’s ability to follow instructions: directed forgetting, 
thought suppression, belief perseverance and psychological reactance. Directed 
forgetting paradigm suggest that when people are learning new information (usually 
lists of unrelated items in the laboratory experiment), instructions to forget some items 
and to remember others are generally effective in decreasing the recall of the former. 
This paradigm appears to be inapplicable to the present study because judicial 
instructions pertaining to defendant’s silence mandate jurors not to consider 
defendant’s refusal to testify rather than to forget his silence and remember another 
fact. The second paradigm, thought suppression, suggests that when people are asked 
to avoid certain thoughts they report an increase in the intrusion of that thought into 
consciousness. This paradigm has a direct applicability to the effectiveness of the 
judicial instructions in the area of the defendant’s right to remain silent. The 
instructions generally ask the jurors to do just that – to suppress the thoughts about 
defendant’s failure to testify, to “simply put the whole matter of the defendant not 
testifying out of your mind”, as the supplemental instructions approved by the 
Sixth.Circuit suggest (United States v. Aloi, 1993).  A third paradigm, that of belief 
perseverance, may also have bearing upon the present research. It maintains that once 
a theory or explanatory structure has been formed, it tends to persevere despite the 
introduction of disconfirming evidence. Applying this theory, jurors would have 
difficulty entertaining alternative grounds for defendant’s silence once they have 
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drawn a negative influence from defendant’s refusal to testify, despite judicial 
instructions not to hold a failure to take the stand against the defendant. Psychological 
reactance is yet another psychological phenomena with direct implications for the 
hypotheses of the current study. Reactance refers to the negative reactions individuals 
experience when they feel that someone is trying to limit their personal freedom. 
Judicial instructions to disregard are likely to endanger jurors’ freedom to consider 
what they might deem important to the verdict, therefore, triggering reactant non-
compliance. In addition, there might be an interactive effect of thought suppression 
and reactance, whereby a high degree of dispositional reactance may amplify the 
paradoxical effect of thought suppression. 
These psychological theories has been investigated in psycholegal research, 
specifically in the area of juror’s inability to comply with curative judicial instructions. 
Judicial instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence have been found not only 
ineffective, but frequently counterproductive. Although many studies addressed jurors’ 
consideration of inadmissible evidence, few of them extended their inquiry to the 
related topic of extralegal evidence, jurors’ perception of the defendant’s refusal to 
testify. Two dissertation studies have touched upon jurors’ perception of defendant’s 
refusal to testify. Results of the first one, a field study, indicated that defendants that 
testified were seen more favorably but found no effect of refusal to testify on the 
verdict. The second study found that defendant’s refusal to testify had no effect on the 
verdict but led to longer sentences for the defendants found to be guilty. The present 
study examined potential effects of thought suppression, belief perseverance and 
reactance in the natural setting of courtroom by extending the research on the effect of 
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judicial instructions to the poorly investigated area of the defendant’s refusal to testify. 
This study attempted to avoid methodological problems present in most of the 
previous mock jury research by utilizing real jurors and an abbreviated version of a 
real trial. 
Research Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I. 
It is hypothesized that curative judicial instructions to disregard will be ineffective in 
preventing the jury from considering defendant’s failure to take the stand. Judicial 
instructions mandating a juror to disregard the defendant’s refusal to testify will 
magnify juror’s negative inference from defendant’s silence leading to a significant 
increase in the conviction rate and severity of the proposed sentence. This effect is 
expected to be particularly significant in the strong admonishment condition 
(STRONG), which is designed to elicit the most psychological reactance from the 
jurors. 
Hypothesis II. 
It is hypothesized that deliberation will not have an effect on the verdict outcome.  
Consistent with the belief perseverance research, there will not be a significant change 
in the determination of  pre- and post- deliberation guilt and severity of sentence. 
Hypothesis III. 
It is hypothesized that jurors draw negative inferences from defendant’s refusal to take 
the stand. Assigning high importance to the defendant’s silence will lead to a higher 
conviction rate. Thus, it is expected that the importance assigned to defendant’s 
silence will have an association with the verdict outcome. 
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4. Methods 
Subjects 
Subjects were 111 women and 68 men drawn from the daily jury pools at the 
Court of Common Pleas for the County of Philadelphia, located at the Criminal Justice 
Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and the Superior Court of Delaware for New 
Castle County, located in Wilmington, Delaware (Total N=179).  Of these, 105 were 
from the Philadelphia Center and 74 were from the Wilmington court.    
Subjects ranged in age from 19 to 73, with a mean age of 43.54 and a standard 
deviation of 12.98 years.  Nearly half of the subjects (44.9%) were between the ages of 
40 and 55.  Jurors were 39.7% Caucasian, 33.5% black or African-American, 21.8% 
Hispanic, and 5% “other” (predominately Asian).  Their reported family incomes 
ranged from “0” to $120,000, with a mean of $46,543 and a standard deviation of $ 
27,428.   However, nearly half (47.1%) of the participating jurors’ family incomes fell 
between $25,000 and $50,000.  Educational levels ranged from 8 years of schooling to 
21 years, with a mean of 13.74 years and a standard deviation of 5.886.  Over 40% 
(43.8) had a high school education or less, while another 42.6% had at least some 
college education and 13.6% had some post-graduate education. 
Materials 
Questionnaires 
  Prior to the presentation of the stimulus video, subjects were asked to fill out a 
demographic questionnaire (Appendix B).  The questionnaire included questions 
concerning age, race, gender, economic status, education, and marital status.  In 
addition, it tested of the efficacy of the “reasonable doubt” standard in the form of a 
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question asking for the percentage of certainty the participant felt was necessary to 
convict.  To examine for accidental bias in the lack of an opportunity to voir dire, the 
questionnaire included questions asking for personal and family employment in law 
enforcement, prior arrests, and prior jury service.  
Dependent variables were measured by the pre-deliberation and post-
deliberation questionnaires (Appendices C and D).  The pre-deliberation questionnaire 
instructed the jurors to render their verdict determining the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence on each of two charges by checking a box for each charge.  Next, if the 
defendant was determined to be guilty on either charge, the subject was asked to 
recommend a sentence of from 1 to 20 years.  In addition, all subjects were asked to 
assign a probability of guilt to the defendant on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
“definitely guilty” to “definitely not guilty,” regardless of their verdict under the first 
question (Appendix C).  Finally, the subjects were asked to rate various elements of 
the trial and certain items of evidence for their importance to his or her verdict on a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from “definitely important” to “definitely not important” 
with “no opinion” assigned a value of 4 (Appendix C).  
The trial elements rated in this manner included (1) the opening argument of 
the prosecutor, (2) the opening argument of the defense attorney, (3) the victim’s 
testimony, (4) the subject’s opinion of the victim’s general credibility, (5) the 
testimony of the police officer (which contained the principal incriminating evidence), 
(6) the subject’s opinion of the police officer’s credibility, (7) the failure of the 
defendant to testify, (8) the defendant’s attorney’s closing argument, (9) the 
prosecutor’s closing argument, and (10) the judge’s instructions.  It should be noted 
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that, in addition to item (7), trial elements (1), (2), (8) and (9) are not items of 
admissible evidence (inasmuch as lawyer arguments are not supposed to be considered 
as evidence), so this question set provides some feedback on the subject’s willingness 
to be influenced by arguments, as opposed to evidence.  
After filling out the pre-deliberation questionnaire, the subjects were asked to 
deliberate in groups and complete the post-deliberation questionnaire (Appendix D). 
This questionnaire instructed jurors to record the group verdict, determine the 
defendant’s guilt, and recommend a sentence if the defendant is determined to be 
guilty, in the same manner as in the pre-deliberation questionnaire.    
Trial stimulus 
 The trial stimuli consisted of three versions of a videotaped and professionally 
edited re-creation of the actual trial testimony in the case of Commonwealth v. Calvin 
Garrett (Appendix E).  These versions were identical in all respects except for their 
level of judicial instruction to disregard the defendant’s decision to remain silent.  In 
version 1, no instruction on this issue was given (the “NO INSTRUCTION” version); 
in version 2, a simple instruction to disregard was given (the “MODERATE” version): 
and in version 3, a severe admonishment to disregard the defendant’s silence was 
given (the “STRONG” version).  
 The MODERATE instruction (reproduced at Appendix E) was taken virtually 
verbatim from the Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions promulgated by the Federal 
Judicial Center (Subcommittee on Pattern Jury Instructions, Committee on the 
Operation of the Jury System, Judicial Conference of the United States, 1987).   This 
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instruction has been adopted in almost identical words by the Sixth, Eighth and 
Eleventh Circuits.  See Appendix E. 
The STRONG instruction (Appendix E) is a compendium of the strongest 
approved instructions found in the case law.  The instructions given in the actual trial 
stimulus case provided an additional framework for the STRONG instruction, due to 
the fact that the trial judge in that case had previously been reversed for failure to give 
the curative charge. As a result, he made every effort to make his charge in the case 
here as strong as he could. 
  In the actual case, defendant Calvin Garrett was tried on the charges of robbery 
and conspiracy.  Garrett was accused of driving the getaway car for his friend, who 
actually committed the gun-point hold up at a bus stop, and of participating in the 
robbery by being found with some of the stolen cash and a bullet from the robbery 
weapon on his person.  In a two-day trial, the police officer who arrested Garrett was 
severely impeached on police procedures involved in the arrest, but was allowed to 
testify to incriminating statements made by the defendant after his arrest. The 
defendant did not take the stand, but the judge gave lengthy instructions to the jury 
regarding the defendant’s right to remain silent. The real jury in the actual trial was not 
able to reach a unanimous verdict (i.e., was a “hung jury”). 
 The actual trial transcript of the trial was edited down to an approximately two 
hour version. Every effort was made in the editing process to “balance” the evidence 
between prosecution and defense in such a manner as to make the outcome a “close” 
question of guilt or innocence, so as to maximize the potential significance of the 
failure of the defendant to testify and the instructions given or not given on this issue.  
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Given the reasonable doubt standard, the bulk of the evidence favoring conviction (the 
identification of defendant’s car, his arrest with his guilty friend and the victim’s 
wallet in that car, and the cash and bullet in his pocket) was retained; however, the 
police officer’s testimony concerning the incriminating statements was deleted and the 
police officer’s testimony regarding the bullet and cash found on defendant was made 
to appear less credible than in the actual case.  The edited transcript was reviewed by 
two experienced trial lawyers with over 40 years of trial experience between them to 
insure that the evidence presented on the video was as “balanced” as it could be as 
between guilty and not guilty verdicts, given the reasonable doubt standard.  It was 
then staged and videotaped by a professional video production company in the mock 
courtroom of Villanova University School of Law.  
 It is noteworthy that among the results of the study, the subjects in the NO 
INSTRUCTION group split fairly evenly (44% not guilty/56% guilty) on guilt or 
innocence on the conspiracy count, thereby suggesting that in the absence of any 
instruction regarding the defendant’s failure to testify, the totality of the videotaped 
trial appeared to the average juror to be a close question, with half of the subjects on 
each side of the edge.   
Further, it should be noted that the evidence was clear that the defendant did not  
physically rob the victim, but, if the prosecution’s evidence was believed, merely 
drove the car and ended up with some of the proceeds.  While the judge gave the 
standard robbery instruction, which would permit a conviction on robbery if the 
defendant were seen as a co-participant in the criminal activity, the average juror 
might well be confused into thinking that actually holding the gun on the victim was 
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necessary for conviction on the robbery charge.  This confusion may have been 
exacerbated by the existence of the conspiracy charge, which provided an alternative 
way in which the jurors could find culpability on the part of the defendant, in a manner 
which appears to a lay person to be more consistent with his role in the crime.  
Experimental procedure 
Philadelphia Jury Commissioner Joel S. Johnson and Wilmington Jury 
Commission Art Bernardino reviewed the questionnaires and procedures to be used 
and gave their respective permissions for the study.  
 As the design consisted of three experimental groups with varying levels of 
cautionary judicial instructions (NO INSTRUCTION, MODERATE AND STRONG, 
the examiner chose a different one of the three versions of the video to use with the 
volunteer jurors on each day, keeping the groups relatively even. 
An announcement was made upon the mid-day release of the jurors from the 
jury pool, alerting jurors to the opportunity to participate in a study of juror decision-
making.  The prospective participants were told that they were going to be asked to 
watch an approximately two hour video and fill out questionnaires, and that they 
would be paid $15 for participating.  (In order to encourage more participation in the 
Wilmington court, this amount was raised to $20.)  Those individuals who chose to 
participate were led to another room (in Philadelphia) or to a corner of the juror 
assembly room (in Wilmington), briefed on the procedure and given informed consent 
forms (Appendix A).  In addition, the examiner advised them that the video contained 
descriptions of an armed robbery and verbal descriptions of violence; and that any 
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prospective subject could withdraw from the study at any time if he or she became 
upset by anything in the video or questionnaire.    
The subjects were asked to fill-out the pre-deliberation questionnaire 
(Appendix C) after they finished viewing the videotape.  These questionnaires were 
collected by the examiner; and the jurors were then assigned to groups consisting of 2-
6 subjects (depending on how many volunteers were available on a given day) and 
requested to conduct group deliberations, culminating in a group verdict. Subsequent 
to group deliberations, each jury group was asked to record their group’s verdict in the 
post-deliberation questionnaire (Appendix D).   If the group was not able to reach a 
verdict in 30 minutes, the examiner declared the jury “hung.”  The group was not told 
in advance of the 30 minute limit; and if they stated that they were unable to reach a 
verdict before the 30 minutes were up, they were encouraged to continue deliberations.   
At the conclusion of each group deliberation, the subjects were debriefed as to the 
purposes of the study and paid their stipend for their participation. 
Methodological limitations 
 Due to the impossibility of expecting volunteer jurors to spend significantly 
more than two hours watching a stimulus video, it was necessary to eliminate certain 
aspects of a real trial which might have had some impact on the results.  For example, 
there was not time to present more than a few witnesses. As a result, such possible 
factors as having a defendant introduce some evidence, even without personally 
testifying, could not be controlled for.  Similarly, the jurors did not have time to 
develop the usual judge-jury rapport, which often takes place in a real courtroom.  
Thus, the potential impact of such a rapport could not be evaluated in this study. 
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 In addition, the trial judge’s charge to the jury was somewhat abbreviated in its 
discussion of the two charges and in general principles of evidence, which could have 
made the instruction to disregard more salient that it might be in a real case.  
Moreover, the potential significance of the difference between the STRONG and 
MODERATE conditions was not tested in advance by doing a manipulation check 
(because they appeared so obviously different).  During data collection, the selection 
of the tape to be shown on a particular day was not subjected to true randomization, 
although no systematic bias was expected.   
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5.  Results 
Sample power was determined using the SPSS Sample Power program. Power  
was estimated to be .82 for the analysis of variance,  requiring 50 subjects per cell with 
a total of 150 subjects required for a medium effect size (.25).  In the actual study, the 
sample sizes were 52, 66 and 61 for the NO INSTRUCTION, MODERATE and 
STRONG groups, respectively.  The pre-deliberation verdicts (collapsed across 
conditions) resulted in the verdict distributions as follows:  the total number of 
individual verdicts was distributed on robbery approximately 32% for guilty and 67% 
for not guilty, and on conspiracy the percentages were reversed, with 69% finding 
guilt and 30% voting not guilty (in each case, 1% of the votes were not validly entered 
by the subject).  This was consistent with the intent of the trial stimulus to be 
ambiguous. 
Data from the pre-deliberation questionnaire (Appendix C) was analyzed first 
with each charge considered separately. The relationship of judicial instructions to the 
verdict was examined using the three levels of instruction as an independent variable 
and the following as dependent variables: pre-deliberation verdicts (question 1), 
recommended sentence (questions 2 and 3), level of guilt (question 4) and trial 
elements (question 5). Similarly, data from the post-deliberation questionnaire 
(Appendix D) was examined using the group verdicts (question 1) and recommended 
sentence (question 2) for each charge as dependent variables.  In addition, the pre-
deliberation results were compared with the post-deliberation results (treating the 
group verdicts and sentences as the post-deliberation verdicts and sentences of each 
individual group member, and eliminating all hung jury results).  Subsequently, 
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ancillary data from the demographic questionnaire (Appendix B) was explored for the 
potential correlation with the verdict outcome. The table below illustrates the main 
analyses performed on the data. 
 
Table 2. Main statistical analyses performed on the data 
__________________________________________________________ 
Pre-deliberation              Verdict                   Sentence                Guilt____      
Robbery                           Chi-sq                     ANOVA              ANOVA** 
Conspiracy                       Chi-sq**                 ANOVA              ANOVA* 
Trial Elements                  Logist reg              Linear reg            Linear reg 
         Stepwise                Stepwise               Stepwise 
Post-deliberation_____________________________________________ 
Robbery                            Chi-sq**                ANOVA** 
Conspiracy                        Chi-sq**                ANOVA 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
** - indicates significance  
*- indicates approaching significance 
 
Pre-deliberation questionnaire 
 Robbery 
          1. Individual verdicts  
Because the guilt rating (guilty- not guilty) is a dichotomous variable, it 
required non-parametric measures. Pre-deliberation verdicts were compared across the 
three instruction conditions using a simple chi-square test. 
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Table 3. Pre-deliberation robbery verdict and judicial instruction level  
  
    
Level of Instruction 
 
            
Total 
Pre-delib robbery 
verdict   
No 
instruction 
Moderate 
instruc-
tion 
Strong 
instruc-
tion   
  Not 
guilty 
Count 38 39 42 119 
    % within Level 
of Instruction 
 
 
73.1% 60.0% 71.2% 67.6% 
  Guilty Count 14 26 17 57 
     
% within Level 
of Instruction 
 
 
26.9% 40.0% 28.8% 32.4% 
Total Count 52 65 59 176 
  % within Level 
of Instruction 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
  Value df 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
 
2.773(a) 2 .250 
Likelihood Ratio 
 2.745 2 .254 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
 
.022 1 .882 
N of Valid Cases 176     
Note: (a ) 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count 
is 16.84. 
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Results showed no difference in pre-deliberation verdicts for robbery on the 
level of judicial instruction (chi-square stat – 2.773, p less than  .250).  
2. Sentence 
Unlike verdict outcome, sentence is a continuous variable that can be analyzed 
using parametric tests. Pre-deliberation sentence scores for robbery were analyzed 
using analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
 
Table 4.  Pre-deliberation robbery sentence and judicial instruction level 
 ANOVA 
 
recom sentence for robbery in years 
 
  
Sum of 
Squares 
 df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
 
26.035           2       13.017 .624 .539 
Within Groups 
 
 
1607.453           77         20.876 
    
Total 1633.488 79       
 
  
 ANOVA revealed no difference between pre-deliberation robbery sentence 
scores on the level of judicial instruction (F=.62, p>.05). 
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3. Level of guilt 
Similarly to the sentence scores, level of guilt scores is a continuous variable 
allowing the parametric test analysis. The effect of instructions on the level of guilt 
was measured using a one-way analysis of variance (One-way ANOVA) 
.  
Table 5.  Robbery guilt level and judicial instruction level 
 ANOVA 
 
Level of guilt for robbery  
  
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 35.221 2 17.611 3.966 .021 
Within Groups 745.949 168 4.440  
  
Total 781.170 170       
 
  
Multiple Comparisons 
 
Dependent Variable: level of guilt for robbery  
Tukey HSD  
(I) Level 
of 
Instruction 
(J) Level of 
Instruction 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
          Lower Bound Upper Bound 
No 
instruction 
Moderate instruction 
-1.12(*) .401 .015 -2.07 -.18 
  Strong instruction 
-.53 .405 .388 -1.49 .42 
Moderate 
instruction 
No instruction 
1.12(*) .401 .015 .18 2.07 
  Strong instruction 
.59 .383 .276 -.32 1.50 
Strong 
instruction 
No instruction 
.53 .405 .388 -.42 1.49 
  Moderate instruction -.59 .383 .276 -1.50 .32 
· The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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Results of the ANOVA revealed a significant difference in the verdict outcome 
among the three groups. To detect where the difference lies, a post-hoc Tukey analysis 
was conducted comparing the means of the three instruction level groups. A post-hoc 
Tukey analysis of the between group variation revealed a significant difference 
between no instruction and moderate instruction condition, with a higher level of guilt 
assessed from jurors receiving the moderate instruction; but no differences between 
any other conditions. 
4. Trial elements 
A relationship between rating of importance of the ten trial elements and pre-
deliberation determination of guilt was examined for the three respective measures of 
guilt: verdict outcome, sentence scores and level of guilt.2 
a. Verdict outcome and trial elements 
 
First, the importance rankings of the ten trial variables were analyzed using 
pre-deliberation verdict outcome (categorical guilt scores) as dependent variables 
(guilty –“1”, non-guilty –“2”). The dichotomous verdict scores necessitated the use of 
logistic regression.  
                                               
2 Alpha level was not subjected to Bonferroni correction which is advisable when a large number of 
comparisons are made.  Some of the findings may no longer be considered significant with Bonferroni-
corrected alpha levels. 
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Table 6.   Pre-deliberation robbery verdict outcome and trial elements rankings  
 Model Summary 
 
Mode
l R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
1 .480(a) .230 .180 .425 
Note: (a )  Predictors: (Constant), Judge's instructions, Defendant's silence,  Victim's 
credibility, Opening argument of defendant, Police officer's testimony, Closing 
argument of defendant, Closing argument of prosecutor, Victim's testimony, Opening 
argument of prosecutor, Police officer's credibility 
 
Coefficients(a) 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standar-
dized 
Coefficien
ts 
t Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for B 
  B Std. Error Beta     Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
(Constant) .170 .225   .755 .451 -.275 .615 
Opening argument 
of prosecutor .039 .028 .156 1.406 .162 -.016 .095 
Opening argument 
of defendant -.075 .028 -.292 -2.711 .007 -.130 -.020 
Victim's testimony .072 .036 .213 1.986 .049 .000 .144 
 Victim's 
credibility .001 .033 .004 .038 .969 -.064 .066 
Police officer's 
testimony -.060 .037 -.181 -1.610 .109 -.133 .014 
Police officer's 
credibility .035 .031 .131 1.130 .260 -.026 .096 
Defendant's 
silence .048 .015 .240 3.289 .001 .019 .077 
Closing argument 
of defendant -.025 .026 -.081 -.952 .343 -.076 .026 
Closing argument 
of prosecutor .052 .025 .197 2.038 .043 .002 .102 
Judge's 
instructions -.043 .031 -.115 -1.410 .161 -.104 .017 
 
Note:  (a)  Dependent Variable: Robbery guilty? 
 
 
  
A stepwise logistic regression revealed that 23% of variation in verdict 
outcome was accounted for by these elements of evidence (r =.23, r squared =.18).  
There was a significant relationship between the following elements of evidence and 
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verdict outcome: defendant’s silence, opening argument of defendant, and closing 
argument of prosecutor. As predicted there was a positive correlation between 
importance of defendant’s silence and a guilty verdict. Those who rated defendant’s 
failure to testify as an important variable were more likely to convict him. In addition, 
assigning importance to closing argument of the prosecutor was positively correlated 
with a finding of guilt.  Rating opening argument of defendant as important had an 
inverse correlation with the finding of guilt. 
 
b. Sentence and trial elements 
 
Because sentence scores are continuous, stepwise linear regression was used to 
analyze a relationship between pre-deliberation sentence score and the importance 
rankings of the ten trial elements. 
 
Table 7.  Pre-deliberation robbery sentence and trial elements rankings  
Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .328(a) .108 -.032 4.363 
 
Note:  (a)  Predictors: (Constant), Judge's instructions,  Victim's credibility, Defendant's silence, Opening argument 
of defendant, Police officer's credibility, Closing argument of defendant, Closing argument of prosecutor, Police 
officer's testimony, Opening argument of prosecutor, Victim's testimony 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Coefficients(a) 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta     
(Constant) 1.712 3.575   .479 .634 
Opening argument of 
prosecutor -.185 .484 -.079 -.383 .703 
Opening argument of 
defendant .284 .432 .118 .658 .513 
Victim's testimony -.856 .846 -.226 -1.011 .316 
 Victim's credibility 1.462 .666 .451 2.196 .032 
Police officer's 
testimony -.609 .539 -.218 -1.130 .263 
Police officer's 
credibility .350 .512 .131 .684 .497 
Defendant's silence .024 .226 .013 .105 .916 
Closing argument of 
defendant -.451 .428 -.170 -1.056 .295 
Closing argument of 
prosecutor .076 .461 .030 .165 .869 
Judge's instructions .479 .529 .140 .905 .369 
 
Note: (a)  Dependent Variable: recommended  sentence for robbery in years 
 
 
 
Results revealed that 11% of the pre-deliberation robbery sentence scores was 
accounted for by the trial elements (r=.33, r squared=.10). Victim’s credibility was the 
only trial element that was a significant predictor of the robbery sentence. As the 
ranking of the victim’s credibility increased so did the robbery sentence. 
c. Guilt level and trial elements 
 
  Stepwise linear regression was used to analyze a relationship between trial 
elements and continuous level of guilt scores.  
 
  
 
86 
 
Table 8.  Pre-deliberation guilt level and trial elements importance ranking 
Model Summary 
 
R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
.445(a) .198 .144 2.005 
 
Note: (a)  Predictors: (Constant), Judge's instructions, Defendant's silence, Police 
officer's testimony, Closing argument of defendant, Victim's testimony, Opening 
argument of prosecutor, Closing argument of prosecutor,  Victim's credibility, 
Opening argument of defendant, Police officer's credibility 
 
 
 
 Coefficients(a) 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta     
(Constant) 3.423 1.077   3.177 .002 
Opening argument 
of prosecutor .223 .134 .190 1.668 .097 
Opening argument 
of defendant -.337 .133 -.280 -2.529 .012 
Victim's testimony .044 .174 .027 .255 .799 
Victim's credibility .083 .159 .059 .522 .603 
Police officer's 
testimony -.054 .176 -.036 -.309 .758 
Police officer's 
credibility -.059 .152 -.048 -.388 .698 
Defendant's silence .109 .071 .117 1.538 .126 
Closing argument of 
defendant -.228 .123 -.165 -1.859 .065 
Closing argument of 
prosecutor .378 .122 .313 3.091 .002 
Judge's instructions -.052 .145 -.030 -.357 .721 
 
Note:  (a) Dependent Variable: level of guilt for robbery 
 
 
  
 
87 
 
Results revealed that 20% of the robbery guilt level determination was 
accounted for by the trial elements (r=.44, r squared =.20). Opening argument of the 
defendant was negatively correlated with the level of guilt, whereas closing argument 
of the prosecutor was positively correlated with the guilt ranking. 
Conspiracy 
          1. Individual verdicts  
Similarly to the individual robbery verdicts, individual conspiracy verdicts 
were compared across the three levels of judicial instruction using non-parametric chi-
square tests. 
 
Table 9.  Pre-deliberation conspiracy verdict and judicial instruction level 
  
Level of Instruction 
    
No instruction Moderate instruction 
Strong 
instruction 
Total 
Count 23 18 13 54 
Not guilty % within Level 
of Instruction 44.2% 27.7% 21.7% 30.5% 
Count 29 47 47 123 
Pre-delib 
conspiracy 
verdict 
Guilty % within Level 
of Instruction 55.8% 72.3% 78.3% 69.5% 
Count 52 65 60 177 
Total 
% within Level 
of Instruction 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.074(a) 2 .029 
Likelihood Ratio 6.934 2 .031 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 6.502 1 .011 
N of Valid Cases 177     
 
Note: (a)  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count 
is 15.86. 
 
 
However, for the pre-deliberation conspiracy verdicts, results revealed a 
significant difference in the verdict outcome for the level of instruction (chi-square 
stat- 7.074, p is less than .05). Consistent with the hypothesis, the stronger instruction 
resulted in a greater percentage of guilty verdicts (78.3%), than moderate instruction 
(72.3%) and no instruction (55.8%); however the differences between the strong and 
moderate groups may not be significant. 
2. Sentence 
As with the robbery sentence scores, the pre-deliberation conspiracy sentence 
scores were compared across the three levels of judicial instructions using a one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
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Table 10.  Pre-deliberation conspiracy sentence and judicial instruction level 
 
 ANOVA 
 
Recommended sentence for conspiracy in years  
  Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 25.406 2 12.703 .628 .535 
Within Groups 2648.564 131 20.218     
Total 2673.970 133       
 
 
A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant difference between  recommended 
sentence scores between the three levels of judicial instruction. 
3. Level of guilt  
Conspiracy level of guilt scores were compared across the three experimental 
conditions using a one-way ANOVA. 
Table 11.  Conspiracy guilt level and judicial instruction level 
 
 ANOVA 
 
Level of guilt for conspiracy  
  Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 16.517 2 8.259 2.253 .108 
Within Groups 637.788 174 3.665     
Total 654.305 176       
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Table 11 (continued) 
Multiple Comparisons 
 
Dependent Variable: level of guilt for conspiracy  
Tukey HSD  
(I) Level of 
Instruction 
(J) Level of 
Instruction 
Mean 
Differenc
e (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
          Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
No instruction Moderate instruction -.50 .355 .335 -1.34 .34 
  Strong instruction -.76 .364 .093 -1.62 .10 
Moderate 
instruction No instruction .50 .355 .335 -.34 1.34 
  Strong instruction -.26 .343 .726 -1.07 .55 
Strong 
instruction No instruction .76 .364 .093 -.10 1.62 
  Moderate instruction .26 .343 .726 -.55 1.07 
 
 
Although the results were not significant (p >.05), they approached significance 
(p<.1). The post-hoc Tukey analysis revealed that there was a difference between no 
instruction and strong instruction on the level of guilt scores on the conspiracy charge, 
with the strong instruction producing a higher level of guilt. 
4. Trial elements 
a. Verdict outcome  
Similarly to the robbery verdict, a stepwise logistic regression was performed 
on the ten trial elements using dichotomous pre-deliberation conspiracy  verdict 
outcome scores.  
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Table 12.  Pre-deliberation conspiracy verdict outcome and trial elements rankings  
 Model Summary 
 
R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
.485(a) .235 .187 .418 
Note:  (a)  Predictors: (Constant), Judge's instructions, Defendant's silence,  Victim's 
credibility, Opening argument of defendant, Police officer's testimony, Closing 
argument of defendant, Closing argument of prosecutor, Victim's testimony, Opening 
argument of prosecutor, Police officer's credibility 
 
  
Coefficients(a) 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for B 
  B Std. Error Beta     Lower Bound Upper Bound 
(Constant) .327 .221   1.481 .141 -.109 .763 
Opening 
argument of 
prosecutor 
.047 .028 .190 1.720 .087 -.007 .102 
Opening 
argument of 
defendant 
-.056 .027 -.220 -2.074 .040 -.109 -.003 
Victim's 
testimony -.032 .036 -.094 -.874 .383 -.103 .040 
 Victim's 
credibility .086 .033 .292 2.630 .009 .021 .150 
Police officer's 
testimony -.043 .036 -.133 -1.193 .235 -.115 .028 
Police officer's 
credibility .014 .030 .052 .456 .649 -.046 .073 
Defendant's 
silence .026 .014 .130 1.801 .074 -.002 .054 
Closing argument 
of defendant -.029 .025 -.100 -1.198 .233 -.078 .019 
Closing argument 
of prosecutor .075 .025 .288 3.008 .003 .026 .124 
Judge's 
instructions -.010 .030 -.027 -.338 .736 -.068 .048 
 
Note:  (a)  Dependent Variable: Conspiracy guilty? 
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The regression revealed that 24% of variation in verdict outcome was 
accounted for by the ranking of importance of these trial elements  (r =.49, r squared 
=.24).  There was a significant relationship between the ranking of the following trial 
elements and verdict outcome: victim’s credibility, opening argument of the defendant 
and closing argument of the prosecutor. The ranking of defendant’s silence 
approached significance (significant at .1). Victim’s credibility and closing argument 
of the prosecutor rankings were positively related to the finding of guilt.  Similarly to 
the robbery verdict above, rating opening argument of defendant as important had an 
inverse correlation with the finding of guilt. 
b. Sentence scores  
Stepwise linear regression was used to analyze a relationship between importance 
ranking of  trial elements and continuous sentence scores. 
 
Table 13.  Pre-deliberation conspiracy sentence and trial elements importance    
ranking 
 Model Summary 
 
R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
.201(a) .040 -.042 4.341 
    
 
Note:  (a)  Predictors: (Constant), Judge's instructions, Defendant's silence,  Victim's 
credibility, Opening argument of defendant, Police officer's credibility, Closing 
argument of prosecutor, Closing argument of defendant, Police officer's testimony, 
Victim's testimony, Opening argument of prosecutor 
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Table 13 (continued) 
Coefficients(a) 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta     
(Constant) 4.419 2.784   1.587 .115 
Opening argument 
of prosecutor -.160 .359 -.069 -.446 .657 
Opening argument 
of defendant -.126 .336 -.055 -.377 .707 
Victim's testimony -.201 .529 -.057 -.380 .705 
 Victim's 
credibility .134 .463 .042 .290 .772 
Police officer's 
testimony -.288 .443 -.097 -.651 .516 
Police officer's 
credibility .020 .375 .008 .054 .957 
Defendant's 
silence -.049 .166 -.027 -.296 .768 
Closing argument 
of defendant .220 .313 .081 .702 .484 
Closing argument 
of prosecutor .456 .345 .165 1.322 .189 
Judge's 
instructions .031 .369 .009 .084 .934 
 
Note:  (a)  Dependent Variable: recom sentence for conspiracy in years 
 
 
The regression revealed that only 4% of variation in recommended sentence 
was accounted for by the ranking of importance of these trial elements  (r =.20, r 
squared =.04).  There was no significant relationship between the ranking of the trial 
elements and recommended sentence.  
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c. Level of guilt 
Similarly to the sentence scores, a relationship of trial elements rankings to the 
level of guilt scores was examined using linear regression.  
 
Table 14.  Conspiracy guilt level and trial elements importance ranking 
                                  Model Summary 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
.522(a) .273 .226 1.711 
 
Note:  (a)   Predictors: (Constant), Judge's instructions, Defendant's silence, Police officer's testimony, Opening 
argument of defendant, Victim's testimony, Closing argument of defendant, Closing argument of prosecutor,  
Victim's credibility, Opening argument of prosecutor, Police officer's credibility 
 
 
 Coefficients(a) 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta     
(Constant) 3.674 .905   4.058 .000 
Opening argument 
of prosecutor .279 .113 .268 2.474 .014 
Opening argument 
of defendant -.365 .111 -.342 -3.284 .001 
Victim's testimony -.163 .146 -.116 -1.115 .266 
 Victim's 
credibility .342 .132 .277 2.581 .011 
Police officer's 
testimony -.140 .148 -.102 -.945 .346 
Police officer's 
credibility .029 .123 .026 .235 .815 
Defendant's 
silence .017 .059 .021 .292 .771 
Closing argument 
of defendant -.189 .100 -.153 -1.883 .062 
Closing argument 
of prosecutor .300 .102 .275 2.954 .004 
Judge's 
instructions .171 .121 .112 1.418 .158 
Note:  (a)  Dependent Variable: level of guilt for conspiracy 
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Results revealed that 28% of the variability in the level of guilt scores was 
accounted for by the importance rankings of the trial elements. Opening argument of 
the prosecutor, victim’s credibility and closing argument of the prosecutor were 
positively correlated with level of guilt scores. Opening argument of the defendant was 
negatively correlated with the level of guilt scores. 
Post-deliberation questionnaire 
Robbery 
   
1. Verdict outcome 
 
The group post-deliberation robbery verdicts were compared across the three 
experimental conditions using a simple chi-square test.  Jury panels that did not reach 
a verdict (12 out of the 61 panels) were excluded from the analysis.   
 
Table 15.  Post-deliberation robbery verdict outcome and judicial instruction level 
  
  
    Level of Instruction Total 
    No instruction Moderate instruction 
Strong 
instruction   
Jury's robbery 
guilty Not guilty Count 38 45 39 122 
    % within Level of Instruction 100.0% 76.3% 92.9% 87.8% 
  Guilty Count 0 14 3 17 
    % within Level of Instruction .0% 23.7% 7.1% 12.2% 
Total Count 38 59 42 139 
  % within Level of Instruction 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 15 (continued): 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.575(a) 2 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 17.002 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .730 1 .393 
N of Valid Cases 139     
 
Note:  (a)  1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 4.65. 
 
 
Results revealed that there was a significant difference in jury robbery verdicts 
across the three experimental conditions. The moderate instruction resulted in the most 
findings of guilt. 
 
  
2. Sentence 
 
A one-way ANOVA was performed to compare post-deliberation robbery sentences 
across the three experimental conditions. 
 
Table 16.  Post-deliberation robbery sentence scores and judicial instruction level 
 
 ANOVA 
 
Jury's recom sentence for robbery in years  
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 95.082 2 47.541 7.196 .003 
Within Groups 204.800 31 6.606     
Total 299.882 33       
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Table 16 (continued)  
 
Multiple Comparisons 
 
Dependent Variable: Jury's recom sentence for robbery in years  
Tukey HSD  
(I) Level of 
Instruction 
(J) Level of 
Instruction 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
          Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
No instruction Moderate instruction -4.35 1.906 .073 -9.04 .34 
  Strong instruction -6.75(*) 1.963 .005 -11.58 -1.92 
Moderate 
instruction No instruction 4.35 1.906 .073 -.34 9.04 
  Strong instruction -2.40(*) .939 .040 -4.71 -.09 
Strong 
instruction No instruction 6.75(*) 1.963 .005 1.92 11.58 
  Moderate instruction 2.40(*) .939 .040 .09 4.71 
 
· The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
 
 
Unlike the pre-deliberation sentence scores which did not vary between the instruction 
groups, post-deliberation robbery sentence scores were significantly different between 
the three groups (F=7.2, p<.01). Post-hoc Tukey analyses revealed a significant 
difference between the no instruction and strong instruction (p<.01), moderate and 
strong (p<.05) and approaching significance between no instruction and moderate 
instruction (p<.1). 
Conspiracy 
  
              1. Individual verdicts 
The group post-deliberation conspiracy verdicts were also compared across the three 
experimental conditions using a simple chi-square test. 
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Table 17.  Post-deliberation conspiracy verdict outcome and judicial instruction level 
  
    Level of Instruction Total 
    No instruction 
Moderate 
instruction 
Strong 
instruction   
Jury's 
conspiracy 
guilty 
Not 
guilty Count 17 0 8 25 
    
% within 
Level of 
Instruction 
39.5% .0% 17.0% 17.5% 
  Guilty Count 26 53 39 118 
    
% within 
Level of 
Instruction 
60.5% 100.0% 83.0% 82.5% 
Total Count 43 53 47 143 
  
% within 
Level of 
Instruction 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 17 (continued) 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 25.731(a) 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 31.950 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 7.204 1 .007 
N of Valid Cases 143     
Note: (a)  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count 
is 7.52. 
 
  
 
Similarly to the post-deliberation robbery verdicts above, results revealed that 
there was a significant difference in jury conspiracy verdicts across the three 
experimental conditions (chi square= 25, p < .001). Jurors in the moderate instruction 
were most likely to find the defendant guilty. 
 
            2. Sentence 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA was performed to compare post-deliberation conspiracy 
sentences across the three experimental conditions. 
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Table 18.  Post-deliberation conspiracy sentence scores and judicial instruction level 
 ANOVA 
 
Jury's recom sentence for conspiracy in years  
 
  Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 36.922 2 18.461 1.556 .215 
Within Groups 1411.898 119 11.865     
Total 1448.820 121       
 
 
 
There was no significant difference on recommended conspiracy sentence 
scores between the three experimental conditions. 
Comparison of pre- and post-deliberation results 
Robbery  
1. Verdicts. 
 
A chi-square test was performed on pre and post-deliberation robbery verdict 
outcomes. 
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Table 19.  Pre-deliberation and post-deliberation robbery verdict outcomes    
 
    Robbery guilty? Total 
    Not guilty Guilty   
Jury's 
robbery 
guilty 
Not guilty Count 91 28 119 
    % of Total 66.9% 20.6% 87.5% 
  Guilty Count 5 12 17 
    % of Total 3.7% 8.8% 12.5% 
Total Count 96 40 136 
  % of Total 70.6% 29.4% 100.0% 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
 
  Value df 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
15.867(b
) 1 .000     
Continuity 
Correction(a) 13.681 1 .000     
Likelihood Ratio 14.328 1 .000     
Fisher's Exact 
Test       .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 15.750 1 .000     
N of Valid Cases 136         
Note:  (a)  Computed only for a 2x2 table 
           (b)  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count 
is 5.00. 
 
 
Results showed a significant difference between the pre and post deliberation 
robbery verdict outcomes. After deliberation, nearly 25% of the subjects changed their 
votes on the robbery charge, with 20.6% changing from a guilty pre-deliberation 
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verdict to a not guilty post-deliberation one, and 3.7% changing their votes the other 
way. 
 2.  Sentences 
A paired t-test was performed on the pre and post deliberation robbery 
sentences scores. 
 
 
Table 20.  Pre-deliberation and post-deliberation robbery sentences    
 
 Paired Samples Statistics 
 
  Mean N Std. Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Pair 1 
Recommeded 
sentence for 
robbery in 
years 
5.27 22 4.410 .940 
  
Jury's recom 
sentence for 
robbery in 
years 
5.50 22 3.098 .660 
 
  
Paired Samples Correlations 
 
  N Correlation Sig. 
Pair 1 Recommended 
sentence for 
robbery in years  
& Jury's 
recommended 
sentence for 
robbery in years 
22 .342 .120 
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Table 20 (continued): 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 
  Paired Differences t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
  Mean 
Std. 
Devia
-tion 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
      
        Lower Upper       
Pair 1 
Recommend. 
sentence for 
robbery in 
years –  
& Jury's 
recommend. 
sentence for 
robbery in 
years 
-.23 4.439 .946 -2.20 1.74 -.240 21 .813 
 
 
There was no significant difference between pre and post deliberation robbery 
sentence score. 
Conspiracy 
 1. Verdict outcome 
 
A chi-square test was performed on pre and post-deliberation conspiracy verdict 
outcomes. 
  
 
104 
 
Table 21.  Pre-deliberation and post-deliberation conspiracy verdict outcomes   
  
Conspiracy guilty? 
    Not 
guilty Guilty 
Total 
Count 13 12 25 
Not guilty 
% of Total 9.2% 8.5% 17.7% 
Count 26 90 116 
Jury's 
conspiracy 
guilty 
Guilty 
% of Total 18.4% 63.8% 82.3% 
Count 39 102 141 
Total 
% of Total 27.7% 72.3% 100.0% 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
 
  Value df 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 8.998(b) 1 .003     
Continuity 
Correction(a) 7.580 1 .006     
Likelihood Ratio 8.235 1 .004     
Fisher's Exact 
Test       .006 .004 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 8.934 1 .003     
N of Valid Cases 141         
 
Note:  (a)  Computed only for a 2x2 table 
           (b)  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count 
is 6.91. 
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On the conspiracy count, the jurors’ deliberation resulted in almost exactly the same 
25% shift in votes, but this time in the opposite direction, with 8.5% of the total 
subjects changing their guilty vote to not guilty and 18.4% changing their not guilty 
vote to guilty. 
2.  Sentence  
A paired t-test was performed on pre and post-deliberation conspiracy sentence scores. 
 
Table 21.  Pre-deliberation and post-deliberation conspiracy sentence scores  
  
 Paired Samples Statistics 
 
  Mean N Std. Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Recommend. 
sentence for 
conspiracy 
in years 
3.91 32 2.798 .495 
Pair 1 Jury's recom 
sentence for 
robbery in 
years 
4.78 32 2.970 .525 
 
 
 Paired Samples Correlations 
 
  N Correlation Sig. 
Pair 1 
Recom. sentence for 
conspiracy in years 
& Jury's Recom. 
sentence for robbery 
in years 
32 .312 .082 
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Table 21 (continued)  
 
Paired Samples Test 
 
  Paired Differences t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
  Mean 
Std. 
Devia
-tion 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
      
        Lower Upper       
Pair 
1 
Recommend. 
sentence for 
conspiracy in 
years - Jury's 
recom 
sentence for 
robbery in 
years 
-.88 3.386 .599 -2.10 .35 -1.462 31 .154 
 
There was no significant difference between pre and post deliberation sentence scores. 
 
Importance of defendant’s refusal to testify on verdict outcome 
Robbery 
1.  Verdict outcome 
 To further examine a relationship between defendant’s silence and juror’s  
perception of his culpability, an independent t-test was conducted to compare whether 
there is a difference in rating of importance of defendant’s silence between the guilty 
and non-guilty verdicts. 
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Table 23.  Difference in importance of defendant’s silence between guilty and non-
guilty robbery verdicts 
Group Statistics 
 
                        Robbery guilty?                 N          Mean      Std. Deviation    Std. Error 
             Mean 
 
Defendant’s silence     Guilty                 57              4.44                 2.291          .304 
                                     Not guilty         118              3.16                2.223          .205 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
    
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
    F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differ
-ence 
Std. 
Error 
Differ
ence 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
                  Lower Upper 
Defendant's 
silence 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
5.839 .017 2.486 174 .014 .93 .373 .191 1.662 
  
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    2.677 121.841 .008 .93 .346 .241 1.612 
 
There was a significant difference between the two verdict outcome groups in the 
importance rating of the defendant’s silence for the robbery charge. 
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Conspiracy 
Likewise, an independent t-test was conducted to compare whether there is a 
difference in rating of importance of defendant’s silence between the guilty and non-
guilty verdicts. 
 
 
Table 24.  Difference in importance of defendant’s silence between guilty and non-
guilty conspiracy verdicts 
  
 
Group Statistics 
 
  Conspiracy guilty? N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Guilty 122 3.85 2.401 .217 Defendant's 
silence 
Not guilty 54 2.93 1.980 .269 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
    
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
    F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differ
ence 
Std. 
Error 
Differ
ence 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
                  Lower Upper 
Defendant's 
silence 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
5.839 .017 2.486 174 .014 .93 .373 .191 1.662 
  
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
    2.677 121.841 .008 .93 .346 .241 1.612 
 
 
 
There was a significant difference between the two verdict outcome groups in the 
importance rating of the defendant’s silence for the conspiracy charge. 
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Additional analyses of the importance of defendant’s silence 
To further examine a relationship of defendant’s silence and verdict outcome, the two 
variables were correlated. 
 
 
Table 25.  Correlations between defendant’s silence and verdict outcome 
 
Correlations 
 
      Defendant's silence 
Kendall's tau_b Robbery guilty? Correlation Coefficient .228(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
    N 175 
  Conspiracy guilty? 
Correlation 
Coefficient .160(*) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .018 
    N 176 
Spearman's rho Robbery guilty? Correlation Coefficient .255(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
    N 175 
  Conspiracy guilty? 
Correlation 
Coefficient .179(*) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .018 
    N 176 
 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 25 (continued) 
 
 
Defendant's silence * Level of Instruction Crosstabulation 
 
    Level of Instruction Total 
    No instruction Moderate instruction 
Strong 
instruction   
Defendant's silence 
Definitely 
Not 
Important 
Count 15 17 27 59 
    % within Level of Instruction 28.8% 26.2% 44.3% 33.1% 
  
Probably 
Not 
Important 
Count 3 0 8 11 
    % within Level of Instruction 5.8% .0% 13.1% 6.2% 
  
Possibly 
Not 
Important 
Count 4 12 5 21 
    % within Level of Instruction 7.7% 18.5% 8.2% 11.8% 
  No Opinion Count 7 13 8 28 
    % within Level of Instruction 13.5% 20.0% 13.1% 15.7% 
  Possibly Important Count 7 4 2 13 
    % within Level of Instruction 13.5% 6.2% 3.3% 7.3% 
  Probably Important Count 3 2 2 7 
    % within Level of Instruction 5.8% 3.1% 3.3% 3.9% 
  Definitely Important Count 13 17 9 39 
    % within Level of Instruction 25.0% 26.2% 14.8% 21.9% 
Total Count 52 65 61 178 
  % within Level of Instruction 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  
 
111 
 
  
Table 25 (continued) 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 24.341(a) 12 .018 
Likelihood Ratio 26.767 12 .008 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 6.359 1 .012 
N of Valid Cases 178     
 
Note:  (a)  9 cells (42.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 2.04. 
 
 
 
Ancillary analyses of possible effects of demographics 
 
 
 To avoid the injection of possible juror bias, analyses were run on all the 
demographic factors to see if any correlated with individual pre-deliberation verdicts, 
as shown in the table below: 
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Table 26.  Correlations of demographic factors with pre-deliberation verdicts 
Cross tabulations 
 
      Robbery guilty? 
Conspiracy 
guilty? 
Spearman's rho age Correlation Coefficient .081 .166(*) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .288 .027 
    N 175 177 
  GENDER Correlation Coefficient -.017 -.115 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .818 .126 
    N 176 177 
  MARITAL Correlation Coefficient -.071 -.027 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .353 .725 
    N 172 173 
  Annual Family Income Correlation Coefficient -.012 -.100 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .879 .216 
    N 152 154 
  Last grade obtained Correlation Coefficient -.061 -.077 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .425 .309 
    N 173 174 
  LAWENFRC Correlation Coefficient .020 .059 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .796 .439 
    N 176 177 
  FAMLAWEN Correlation Coefficient -.011 .050 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .883 .511 
    N 175 176 
  ARRESTED Correlation Coefficient .010 -.061 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .892 .416 
    N 176 177 
  FAMARRES Correlation Coefficient -.067 .043 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .379 .570 
    N 173 174 
  JURYBFR Correlation Coefficient .005 .136 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .952 .073 
    N 174 175 
  Robbery guilty? Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .382(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 176 174 
  Conspiracy guilty? Correlation Coefficient .382(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 174 177 
 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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None of the possible demographic variables correlated with individual guilty 
verdicts except age in the case of conspiracy verdicts, with older subjects more likely 
to find guilt on the conspiracy count.   Prior jury service had a positive correlation with 
conviction on the conspiracy count, approaching significance (p <.1). 
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6.  Discussion 
The rebound effect of judicial instructions 
 This study validates the hypothesis that a judge’s instructions to a jury not to 
consider a defendant’s failure to testify has the opposite effect from that intended: it 
leads to a higher probability that the jury will convict the non-testifying defendant. For 
example, on the individual jurors’ pre-deliberation questionnaires, over 72% voted to 
convict on the conspiracy charge after being given the MODERATE instruction to 
disregard the defendant’s failure to testify, and over 78% voted to convict after being 
given the STRONG instruction, as compared to only about 56% of those jurors who 
received no instruction on this issue.  The chi-square performed on this statistic 
revealed a significant difference between in the conspiracy verdict outcome for the 
level of instruction (see Table 8). Similarly, another measure of defendant’s 
culpability, level of guilt, also revealed a difference between NO INSTRUCTION and 
STRONG instruction (approaching significance) (see Table 10). 
On the robbery charge, the pre-deliberation verdict outcome results were not 
statistically significant (see Table 2), although 40% of those jurors who received the 
MODERATE charge voted guilty, while only about 27% voted that way when they 
received NO INSTRUCTION.  On the other hand, level of guilt did reveal significant 
differences between the experimental groups with subjects in the MODERATE 
instruction group assigning the highest level of guilt (see Table 4). 
 The post-deliberation results were even more dramatic.  Although 100% of 
those who received no instruction and then deliberated to a verdict voted to acquit the  
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defendant of the robbery charge, 23.7% of the those who received the MODERATE 
instruction and 7.1% of those who received the STRONG instruction voted to convict 
him.  The chi-square analysis revealed the highest level of significance for these 
results (p<.001) (see Table 14). On the post-deliberation conspiracy charge, only 
60.5% of those receiving no instruction reached a guilty verdict, while 100% of those 
receiving the MODERATE instruction and 83% of those receiving the STRONG 
instruction did so.  The chi-square test showed highly significant differences (p <.001), 
showing a high level of confidence in the conclusion (see Table 16). 
 The results of the present study could possibly be explained by the theories of 
thought suppression and psychological reactance; however, the design of this study did 
not include specific measurements of these phenomena. As the psychological literature 
on these phenomena indicates instructions to suppress a particular thought, especially 
if they are perceived as a threat to one’s freedom of thought, are likely to result in a 
“boomerang” effect. This is consistent with the prior research on general 
ineffectiveness of curative judicial instructions and jurors’ difficulty in disregarding 
inadmissible evidence. However, the effect of these psychological phenomena is not 
absolute, as the additional hypothesis that the stronger the instruction, the more 
adverse impact it would have on the defendant, was not supported by the study.   
Instead, except in the case of the pre-deliberation conspiracy verdicts where the 
STRONG instruction produced a 5% greater percentage of guilty verdicts than did the 
MODERATE one, the MODERATE instruction was generally more likely to produce 
the “backfire” effect of a guilty verdict than was the STRONG instruction. This 
suggests that while there appeared to be a categorical difference between “no 
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instruction” and some instruction, the amount or length of the instruction to forget did 
not seem to have an impact on the jurors’ verdicts.   This could be because the thought 
suppression rebound occurs at approximately the same rate regardless of the level of 
instruction. This is not inconsistent with the research on thought suppression, although 
thought suppression experiments have never measured the effect of the varying 
degrees of instruction to suppress upon the frequency of the intrusion of the forbidden 
thought. Although applying the Wegner and Erber theory (1992), one would 
intuitively hypothesize that the stronger instruction would place higher demands on the 
subjects’ processing resources and lead to more frequent checking of the suppressed 
thought by the automatic target search, this has not been conclusively borne out by this 
study. It is unclear from the present study whether degree of instruction to suppress 
leads to incrementally greater suppression, or whether the effects are due to extraneous 
psychological phenomena, such as cognitive dissonance. 
Cognitive dissonance is the unpleasant state that occurs when individuals 
discover inconsistencies between two of their attitudes or between their attitudes and 
their behavior (Byrne, 1991). This theory proposes that human beings dislike 
inconsistency and will strive to reduce it. Cognitive dissonance may lessen the 
paradoxical effect of reactance when a juror’s belief in his freedom of thought is 
inconsistent with his belief in his sanctity of his oath as a juror and his promise to 
follow judicial instructions. In the present study, the stronger instructions were more 
likely to induce cognitive dissonance, by simultaneously infringing on their freedom 
of thought (thereby causing reactance) yet appealing to their “oath’ and “promise” as a 
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juror to follow the court’s instructions and their respect for the Constitution (thereby 
causing cognitive dissonance).  
 It is possible that the ”freedom of thought” reaction that may motivate a juror 
to put substantial weight on a fact that he is told to disregard can be counteracted by an 
instruction that places very substantial emphasis on the defendant’s constitutional right 
not to testify and which provides non-judgmental reasons why a defendant might not 
want to testify.  In this situation, a judge’s appeal to the jurors’ shared social values, 
embodied in the Constitution that is seen as the cornerstone of American liberty and 
democracy, may produce a stronger desire to obey the instruction than the inherent 
tendency they may have to rebel against it.  Yet, even with the interaction of thought 
suppression, psychological reactance and cognitive dissonance, the STRONG 
instruction still resulted in higher percentages of guilty verdicts than did no instruction 
at all.  
A possible explanation for this result may also lie in the variability of 
dispositional reactance within the jury pool. Psychological research suggests that 
reactance may be not only a situational but also a dispositional trait (see above 
Graybar et al., 1989; Kelly & Nauta, 1997). Thus, Graybar et al. (1989) found that for 
subjects high in behavioral reactance a low amount of negatively toned advice was 
most effective in facilitating attitudinal change whereas for subjects low in behavioral 
reactance high amount of either negatively or positively toned advice was most 
effective. Therefore, jurors with a higher degree of reactance may have rebelled 
against the stronger degree of instruction while those with a lesser degree of 
dispositional reactance were persuaded by the stronger instruction and complied with 
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the command. (Unfortunately, it is impossible to isolate the reactance factor in the 
present study because testing for dispositional reactance was an a posteriori 
conclusion, neither conducted nor suggested in the prior mock jury reactance 
research). 
The impact of deliberations on verdict outcome 
The second hypothesis was not validated by the present study. The deliberative 
process did have some impact on the psychological phenomena at play in the jurors’ 
minds:  if anything, it produced a more pronounced paradoxical effect, with the 
instructions causing an even more dramatic “backfire” than in the case of the pre-
deliberation verdicts. This effect appears to be consistent with the thought suppression 
and reactance paradigms, but may be inconsistent with belief perseverance, as there 
was a major shift in verdict outcome and sentencing. However, this may be accounted 
for by the nature of the fact pattern evidenced in the trial stimulus and the difficulties 
lay jurors have in understanding somewhat esoteric legal instructions on robbery and 
conspiracy.  As noted above, almost 25% of the subject jurors changed their votes 
after deliberating, but almost all of these changes were from guilty to not guilty on the 
robbery charge and from not guilty to guilty on the conspiracy charge.  A lay juror 
may well have difficulty finding a defendant who merely drove the car and received 
$20 of the robbery proceeds “equally guilty” of the robbery as his friend who held the 
gun on the victim; and the judge’s standard instruction on the elements of the crime of 
“robbery” fit the friend far more than they fit the defendant here.  The elements of the 
conspiracy count, however, were much more congruent with the level of culpability 
attributable to the defendant in this trial stimulus.  Thus, the supposition is that in 
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deliberations, the jurors convinced each other to make “the crime fit the facts” by 
acquitting on robbery and convicting on conspiracy (not understanding, perhaps, that 
they were perfectly free to find guilt on both at once).  
Limitation on use of sentencing data 
In reaching the conclusions above, the sentencing data has been largely ignored.   
There were no significant associations with levels of instruction revealed in the data, 
except in the case of post-deliberation robbery sentences.   However, upon analysis, 
the data from this portion of the pre- and post-deliberation questionnaires is unreliable, 
because, if the questionnaires were filled out correctly, only the subjects reaching a 
guilty conclusion, individually and/or collectively, would supply a value on this 
question.  Given the number of guilty verdicts reached by the subjects in this study, the 
sample sizes for most of the sentencing/level of instruction comparisons were less than 
would be statistically required to produce reliable data.  This is particularly true with 
post-deliberation robbery verdicts, which were quite small in all instruction categories. 
In addition, during the actual administration of the questionnaires, a significant 
number of jurors appeared to have misunderstood the directions and entered a number 
on the line for a sentence even though they reached a not guilty verdict.   These jurors 
apparently thought that the question called for them to determine a hypothetical 
sentence even with a not guilty verdict.  The instruction to determine the length of the 
sentence should have been clarified in the questionnaire by requesting the jurors to 
skip the sentencing question if they found the defendant not guilty. Additionally, some 
jurors that convicted defendant on both charges entered a sentence only for the robbery 
charge, suggesting that these jurors might have been confused about the concurrent or 
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consecutive effect of the sentence. The difficulties experienced by jurors in sentencing 
a defendant are well-known in the legal community and appear to be one of the 
grounds why majority of jurisdictions relegate the sentencing role to the judicial 
authority. For these reasons, the sentencing data has limited internal and external 
validity, reliability and generalizability. 
Importance of defendant’s refusal to testify on verdict outcome 
 To test the third hypothesis, the subject jurors’ scores on the importance/non-
importance of the defendant’s not testifying were compared using their individual pre-
deliberation verdicts (see Tables 22 and 23).  The results, which were highly 
significant for all verdict outcomes, showed that the higher the level of importance the 
juror ascribed to the defendant’s not testifying, the more likely that that juror would 
reach a guilty verdict.  This is also borne out in the logistic regression analysis, where 
defendant’s silence was shown to be a significant predictor of the verdict outcome for 
the robbery verdicts and approached significance for the conspiracy verdicts (Tables 5 
and 11).  Although other factors entered into the jurors’ deliberative processes—
opening and closing arguments of defense and prosecutor together with the credibility 
of the victim had the highest predictive values—the defendant’s failure to testify 
remained a significant factor in all verdict outcomes.   
Practical Implications of the Study 
 
The obvious practical implication of this study is that criminal defense attorneys 
should think twice about requesting the “right not to testify” instruction, as it is more 
likely to do harm to their clients’ interests than would be the case if no instruction 
were given.  This is particularly true since the majority of jurisdictions which have 
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standardized jury instructions on the right not to testify have instructions which mirror 
the MODERATE instruction used in this study, i.e., the instruction which led to the 
greatest percentage of convictions (See Appendix E).  While convincing a trial judge 
to issue a stronger, more detailed instruction might ameliorate some of the 
psychological harm arising from calling the jurors’ attention to the issue, this may 
prove to be an insurmountable hurdle. 
From this author’s experience as an intern to both a Pennsylvania state court 
trial judge and a U.S. Federal District Judge, and from many conversations with 
practicing attorneys, it is a rare trial judge who is willing to depart from “approved” 
jury instructions, especially when they are promulgated by a higher court, such as the 
Circuit Courts of the United States, which will then be sitting in review of the trial 
court’s actions.  This is especially true if the prosecution objects to expanding the 
instruction beyond the approved form; and any prosecutor familiar with this study 
should raise such an objection given the results discussed above.  Thus, as a practical 
matter, a defense attorney’s only option when faced with a situation where it is not 
advisable that the defendant takes the stand is to request the standard instruction or no 
instruction at all. 
This study also suggests that it may be unnecessary to remind a modern 
American jury of a defendant’s right to remain silent.  The prevalence of TV cop 
shows and “Law and Order” type legal dramas have ingrained the concept of “reading 
a suspect his rights” and “you have the right to remain silent…” into the subconscious 
of the average juror, such that it is hardly necessary for a judge to “instruct” on this 
issue.  This is exemplified by the fact that of those subjects who received NO 
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INSTRUCTION, fully 28.8% responded that the defendant’s failure to testify was 
“definitely not important” (Table 24) to their decision-making, suggesting that they 
understood that they were not supposed to consider this issue.  Another 27% of those 
who did not receive any judicial guidance in this area deemed the defendant’s failure 
to testify as being possibly or probably unimportant or had no opinion on the subject 
(which suggests they did not give the idea much thought either way).  Thus, nearly 
56% of the subject jurors did not feel that the defendant’s failure to testify was all that 
important—even without instruction to that effect (see Table 24). 
Indeed, those who received the MODERATE instruction had almost identical 
scores on the question of importance of the defendant’s failure to testify on their 
verdicts.  26.7% of the MODERATE group held the “definitely not important” view, 
while 55.2% of that set of jurors found the failure to testify of being of little 
importance or had no opinion on the issue—in each case, slightly less pro-defendant in 
their opinions on this issue than the NO INSTRUCTION group.  Thus, giving the 
MODERATE instruction produced no gain at all in the percentage of jurors who 
down-rated or were said they were disregarding the defendant’s failure to testify, yet it 
had substantial negative consequences to the defendant in the form of the 
psychological boomerang produced by thought suppression and reactance processes.  
The fact that the STRONG instruction did dramatically increase the 
consciousness of the jurors in that group to their duty to disregard the defendant’s 
failure to take the stand means that instructions can have an impact on a juror’s 
thought processes in this context.  Fully 44.3% of the STRONG group jurors believed 
that the failure to testify was “definitely not important,” a 66% increase over the 
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MODERATE group in the percentage of jurors holding this extreme position; and 
nearly 79% of the STRONG participants rated the failure to testify as being of no or 
lesser importance or had no opinion on the subject.  See Table 24.  Thus, when a trial 
judge does give an expansive instruction on the defendant’s right not to testify, it is 
heard and leads to jurors consciously attempting to follow the instruction, at least in 
the way they characterize their own decision-making in their questionnaire responses.  
However, it must be remembered that even among this group, a 20% higher 
conspiracy conviction rate was obtained over the group that had received no 
instruction, which evidences the fact that even when jurors consciously attempt to 
“disregard” the failure to testify, they fail to do so. 
Thus, even when a defense attorney is able to persuade a trial judge to give the 
long, folksy “disregard” instruction—replete with appeals to patriotic and 
constitutional ideals—which was given to the STRONG group in this study, the 
benefits appear to be outweighed by the psychological detriment created by thought 
suppression and psychological reactance processes which are triggered by the 
instruction.  Instead, for those attorneys who are concerned about the potential 
negative connotations which the average person might draw from the defendant’s 
failure to testify in his own defense, connotations which have been documented in 
prior studies [Shilling, 1983; Johnson, 1983], the defense’s opening statement might 
be a more efficacious and less detrimental place to remind the jury of the defendant’s 
right not to testify.  The opening statement of the defendant’s counsel had the highest 
correlation to a not guilty verdict of any of the trial elements examined in this study 
(see Tables 5, 7 and 11); and, coming at the outset of the trial as the first thing the jury 
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hears concerning the defense’s position on the case, it enjoys the psychological benefit 
of primacy in the jurors’ minds.  The importance of the opening argument is supported 
by research on belief perseverance which maintains that beliefs are hard to change 
once “explanatory structure” has been formed, even with the introduction of 
disconfirming evidence. Thus, an attempt to “prime” the jurors to the fact that the 
defendant will not be testifying and that they should constitutionally disregard that fact 
might stand a better chance of achieving the defense’s goal of overcoming the negative 
inference created by the failure to testify without the psychological detriment caused 
by having the judge remind them of this issue just before they begin deliberations.  For 
those jurisdictions which permit attorneys to voir dire jurors during jury selection, that 
too would be an opportunity to prime potential jurors on this issue.  In those rare 
courts where the trial court “pre-instructs” the jury prior to even the opening 
statements, such an instruction as the STRONG instruction used here might have a 
better impact  than it did coming at the end of the trial.  This study has not attempted 
to measure the impact of such priming techniques; although it should be noted that the 
defense opening statement in the trial stimulus used here did not mention that the 
defendant would not testify, nor did he introduce the concept of the right not to testify.  
Directions for future research 
The results of the current study suggest the possible interplay of thought 
suppression, belief perseverance and reactance in jury decision-making. Mock jury 
research can clearly benefit from further investigation of the role of these phenomena 
in jury behavior. However, the experimental design of the future studies should 
include baseline measures of these phenomena consistent with original laboratory 
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research of these paradigms. In addition, trial stimulus should be carefully constructed 
to isolate the effect of the target psychological phenomena while controlling for 
extraneous ones, such as cognitive dissonance.  
As noted above, the data could have been more thoroughly examined had it 
been possible to control for the degree of dispositional reactance of the subjects, as 
there appears to be an interaction between different dispositional reactance levels and 
receptivity to messages of varying degrees and value loads (see above Graybar et al, 
1989).  It is recommended that future mock jury research investigating reactance 
phenomena measure the pre-existing subject reactance level by either administering a 
measure of reactance (e.g., Therapeutic Reactance Scale as in Graybar et al., 1989; 
Questionnaire for Measuring Psychological Reactance as in Pepper, 1997) or 
requesting subjects to rate the importance of the to-be-threatened freedom on the 
Likert scale before exposing them to the threat to this freedom. 
Further testing of the effects of thought suppression on jury deliberations might 
benefit from tape recording the jury’s deliberations to ascertain if the thought, which 
the jury was instructed to disregard, was in fact discussed anyway.  Also, the 
researcher could have the jurors report the intrusion of the prohibited thought in the 
manner consistent with the original Wegner paradigm (1987). 
Since end-of-trial instructions do not appear to be efficacious in dealing with 
the psychological effect of a defendant’s decision not to testify, other ways of 
addressing this issue need to be studied.  Introducing the instruction at the outset of 
trial (in an opening statement or judicial pre-instruction) should be examined to 
ascertain if beliefs regarding the defendant’s silence would persevere despite 
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disconfirming evidence.  For example, an experiment which has an attorney state a 
fact in an opening with confidence and seeming authority, but which fact is later 
disconfirmed by the evidence actually admitted, would examine the belief 
perseverence phenomenon more directly. 
Finally, it is recommended that for future mock jury research level of guilt 
scores are used as a continuous measure of defendant’s culpability rather than (or in 
addition to) sentencing scores. Sentencing scores appear to be of limited use as a 
measure of defendant’s culpability as the jurors have varying baseline notions of the 
average sentence length for a given charge, and the sentence scores are only assigned 
when the defendant is found guilty.  
7.  Summary and Conclusion 
 Although this study reveals that the psychological phenomena of thought 
suppression and reactance may play a role in determining the efficacy of a judicial 
instruction to disregard a criminal defendant’s failure to testify, caution must be 
exercised in applying this conclusion to other courtroom settings.  The precise impact 
of psychological reactance and its interplay with cognitive dissonance requires further 
research with pre-testing of jurors for their levels of reactance and the use of differing 
formulaic instructions to ascertain how these processes might apply to other instances 
of judicial directions to disregard facts or evidence.  In addition, differing natures of 
cases and fact patterns may introduce even more psychological variables into the 
studied equations.  However, even this initial analysis into the efficacy of one of the 
most revered instructions in the criminal defense attorney’s arsenal can have a major 
impact on legal professionals. Indeed, any defense counsel who is confronted with the 
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choice between requesting or not requesting the “right to silence” charge must now 
rethink that issue in light of these findings. 
As Thompson and Fuqua (1998; in Golding and MacLeod, 1998) state:  “By 
making our findings available to legal professionals, and by explaining their relevance 
to evidentiary issues, psychologists can assist in the development of a more rational 
basis for the law.”  It is hoped that this study is a step in that direction.  And, it should 
be noted that the advice and counsel of the experienced trial lawyers who assisted the 
author in editing and producing the trial stimulus proved to be an invaluable in 
creating the framework for a meaningful experimental setting.  Thus, to paraphrase 
Thompson and Fuqua, by melding the knowledge of psychologists and legal 
professionals, the processes of the law might become better understood, as the 
essential human dynamic, which is the foundation stone of our historic jury system, is 
clarified and explained. 
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APPENDIX A:  CONSENT FORM 
 
 
                  ID# _________ 
 
                                               Drexel University College of Medicine 
 Consent to Take Part 
 In a Research Study 
 
 1. Subject Name:                          
 
2. Title of Research:  The effect of judicial instructions on jury consideration of the 
defendant’s refusal to testify. 
3. Research Entity: This research study is being done by the researcher of the 
Philadelphia Health & Education Corporation  which does business under the 
name Drexel University College of Medicine. Drexel University is a separate 
corporation and is not involved in or a party to this research study. 
4. Consenting for the Research Study: This is a long and an important document. If 
you sign it, you will be authorizing the Drexel University College of Medicine and 
its researcher to perform research studies on you. You should take your time and 
carefully read it. You can also take a copy of this consent form to discuss it with 
your family member, physician, attorney or any one else you would like before 
you sign it. Do not sign it unless you are comfortable in participating in this study. 
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 5. Purpose of Research:  
You are being asked to take part in a research study.  The purpose of this study 
is to find out if judicial instructions influence how jurors perceive the 
defendant’s refusal to take a stand in a criminal case. This study is conducted by 
a graduate student as a partial fulfillment of her Ph.D. in clinical psychology.  
The study will involve approximately 180 subjects drawn from a jury pool.  
6. Procedures and Duration: 
You understand that the following things will be done to you.  You will be 
asked to watch a 2 hour videotape of the recreated version of an actual trial. The 
subject matter of the trial involves charges of robbery and conspiracy. You will 
then be asked to answer a questionnaire pertaining to the trial. The questions 
will ask you to attribute guilt or innocence to the the defendant and to rate 
credibility of the parties. Subsequently, you will be assigned to a group of three 
to six jurors and asked to deliberate. Once your jury has determined a verdict 
you will be asked to record your verdict on a final form. The entire process will 
take between 2 1\2 hours.   
7.   Risks/Discomforts:  
You have been told that the risks and/or discomforts of being a subject in this                                 
research project are/or might be: the video tape trial is an actual trial that 
involves charges and verbal descriptions of violence. If such topics are 
bothersome to you, please do not volunteer for the study. If you or someone 
close to you has been a victim of robbery, you are not advised to participate in 
this study because watching descriptions of violence may bring up memories of 
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that incident. 
8.   Benefits:  
There may or may not be any direct benefits to the participants of this study. 
Depending on the outcome of the study, it may assist legal practitioners in 
developing more effective techniques for representation of their clients.  
Much of our current understanding of jury behavior is based upon studies that 
used students as participants. Studies that use potential jurors as participants can 
help provide information that is vital to a true understanding of the jury decision 
making process.  
9.    Voluntary participation: 
Participation in this trial is voluntary, and you can refuse to be in the study or stop 
at  any time by informing the investigator.  
10.   Compensation: 
You  will receive $15 for your participation once you  have completed the study.                                             
Only those participants who are available to watch the videotape are eligible to    
receive the $15.  
11.   In case of injury: 
If you have any questions or believe you have been injured in any way by being 
in this research study, you should contact Dr. Heilbrun at telephone (215) 762-
3634 .  
If you are injured by the research activity that is underlined in section 4 above, 
we will reimburse you for the reasonable costs of medically necessary treatment 
that is not covered by your health insurance or plan. This agreement to reimburse 
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you does not include treatment for any injury that is not a result of the research 
activity. No other payments will be made. If you are injured or have an adverse 
reaction, you should also contact the Office of Research Compliance at (215) 
762-3453. 
12.   Confidentiality: 
All data obtained in this study will be kept confidential. In any publication or 
presentation of research results your identity will be kept confidential but there 
is a possibility that records which identify you may be inspected by authorized 
individuals such as representatives the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), or 
employees conducting peer review activities. I consent to such inspections and 
to the copying of excerpts from my records, if required by any of these 
representatives. 
13.    Other considerations                                                   
If new information becomes known that will affect you or might change your 
decision to be in this study, you will be informed by the investigator.  If you 
have any questions at any time about this study, you may contact Dr. Heilbrun at 
(215) 762-3634 and the Office of Research Compliance  at (215)762-3453. 
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14. Consent 
 
[This consent section, signatures section and list of individuals authorized to 
obtain consent should all be on one page.] 
 
   I have been informed of the reasons for this study. 
   I have had the study explained to me. 
   I have had all of my questions answered. 
   I have carefully read this consent form, have initialed each page, and have 
received a signed copy. 
   I give consent voluntarily. 
 
 
                                                                              
Participant/Authorized Representative Date   Relationship, if 
applicable 
 
 
                                                               
Investigator or Individual obtaining this consent                    Date 
 
 
                                                              
Witness to Signature       Date 
 
List of Individuals Authorized to Obtain Consent: 
 
Name    Title   Day Phone #  24 hour Phone # 
Victoria Zdrok                Investigator            (917) 319-7274              (917) 319-7274 
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APPENDIX B:   DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
Demographic Questionnaire  
         ID#_________________ 
 
Please do not skip any questions. Mark the appropriate box or 
write the information requested. Please do not place your name on any 
of these questionnaires.  
 
DATE OF BIRTH _________                           CURRENT AGE_______ 
GENDER___ Male____ Female  
 
RACE___CAUCASIAN____BLACK ____ HISPANIC____OTHER  
 
MARITAL STATUS ____MARRIED____NEVER MARR____DIVORCED____WIDOW  
____OTHER  
 
ANNUAL FAMILY INCOME 
 
  $___________________________ 
 
PLEASE INDICATE THE LAST EDUCATIONAL GRADE LEVEL SUCCESSFULLY 
COMPLETED (including college)______________________________________ 
 
PLEASE INDICATE FROM 0-100 PERCENT, HOW SURE YOU WOULD HAVE TO BE TO 
CONVICT SOMEONE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT ______%  
 
HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED IN THE FIELD OF LAW ENFORCEMENT? 
______NO______YES  
 
HAVE ANY OF YOUR FAMILY MEMBERS OR FRIENDS EVER BEEN EMPLOYED IN THE 
FIELD OF LAW ENFORCMENT? 
______NO______YES  
 
HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR DETAINED IN POLICE CUSTODY? 
______NO______YES  
 
PLEASE INDICATE WHY __________________ 
 
HAVE ANY OF YOUR FAMILY MEMBERS OR FRIENDS EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR 
DETAINED IN POLICE CUSTODY? 
______NO______YES  
 
PLEASE INDICATE WHY __________________ 
 
HAVE YOU EVER SERVED ON A JURY BEFORE? _______NO______YES_____DATE  
 
HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISQUALIFIED FROM SERVING  ON A JURY?____NO___YES      
____DATE  
 
PLEASE INDICATE WHY YOU THINK YOU WERE DISQUALIFIED__________________  
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APPENDIX C:   PRE-DELIBERATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 Pre-Deliberation Questionnaire                   ID#     
PLEASE ANSWER EACH QUESTION BELOW AS COMPLETELY AS 
POSSIBLE WITHOUT SKIPPING ANY QUESTIONS OR LEAVING THEM 
BLANK.  
1) I personally would find The defendant Calvin Garrett:  
(Please check only one choice for both A and B)  
A) not guilty of robbery  _______ 
      guilty of robbery ______ 
B) not guilty of conspiracy ______ 
     guilty of conspiracy _______ 
2) If you would find The defendant Calvin Garrett guilty of robbery indicate a                                                                               
recommended sentence (in years) between 1 year (minimum) to 
      20 years (maximum) _____ 
     3) If you would find The defendant Calvin Garrett guilty of conspiracy  
         indicate a recommended sentence (in years) between 1 year (minimum) to  
         20 years (maximum) _____ 
     4) Please indicate on the scale below how guilty/innocent you believe the The 
defendant to be of robbery ________ and of conspiracy__________.  
7                     6                    5                      4                         3                 2                  1  
Definitely                 Probably                  No                     Probably              Definitely  
Guilty                        Guilty                 Opinion                Not Guilty            Not Guilty  
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5) Please indicate how important each of the pieces of evidence below were in making 
your decision. Rate each of the pieces of evidence with the scale below in the space 
provided on the right.  
7                       6                     5                      4                         3                  2               1  
Definitely                      Probably                   No                    Probably                    Not  
Important                      Important             Opinion             Not Important           
Important  
a) Opening arguments of Prosecutor, Ms. Domsky ______ 
b) Opening arguments of The defendant's attorney, Mr. Zdrok _______ 
c) Victim Ms. Goode’s testimony ________ 
d) Victim Ms. Goode’s credibility/believability ________ 
e) Officer Russel’s testimony ________ 
f) Officer Russel’s credibility/believability _______ 
g) Officer Kane’s testimony ________ 
h) Officer Kane’s credibility/believability _______ 
i) The defendant Calvin Garrett’s testimony or refusal to take the stand _______  
j) Closing arguments of The defendant's attorney, Mr. Zdrok ________  
k) Closing arguments of  Prosecutor,  Ms. Domsky _______ 
l) The judge's instructions ____________ 
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APPENDIX  D:  POST-DELIBERATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Post-deliberation Questionnaire     
Time started Deliberations _________ 
FINAL JURY DECISION  
WE, the jury in the case of the Commonwealth vs. Garrett  find the The defendant 
Garrett:  
1) (Please check only one choice for both A and B)  
A) not guilty of robbery _______ 
      guilty of robbery _______ 
                                       the jury could not reach a decision _______ 
B) not guilty of conspiracy________ 
                                       guilty of conspiracy________  
                           the jury could not reach a decision ________ 
    2)   If you found The defendant Garrett guilty of robbery indicate the jury's                                                            
                 recommended sentence (in years) between 1 year (minimum) to 
                 20 years (maximum)_______ 
   3)   If you found The defendant Garrett guilty of conspiracy indicate the 
jury's                                                            
                 recommended sentence (in years) between 1 year (minimum) to 
                 20 years (maximum)_______ 
Jury Members ID#s  
____________________Foreperson                   _________________________ 
____________________                                     _________________________ 
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APPENDIX E:  RELEVANT JURY INSTRUCTIONS RE DEFENDANT’S 
RIGHT NOT TO TESTIFY 
 
 
 
 
 
1.) The “MODERATE” Instruction used in the study: 
 
“Remember that a defendant has an absolute right not to testify.  The fact that 
defendant did not testify should not be considered by you in any way or even be 
discussed in your deliberations.  I remind you that it is up to the Government to prove 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; it is not up to the defendant to prove 
that he is not guilty.” 
 
2.) The “STRONG” Instruction used in the study: 
“The defendant did not take the witness stand.  I think all of you when you got 
into the jury box and were questioned, I think you manifested in no uncertain terms 
that you understood that a person does not have to do a darn thing in his own defense.  
The Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
defendant’s innocence or guilt.  So therefore, if the defendant decides not to take the 
witness stand, you cannot draw any unfavorable inference from that.  In other words, 
you cannot say, ‘Ah, ha! He must have something to hide.’  You cannot do that.  
That’s the oath.  That’s the promise.  That’s the instruction.  You must indicate to the 
Court that you would be able to follow the instructions.  That’s very simple.  All you 
have to do is take the evidence as presented by the Commonwealth, and if the defense 
decides not to introduce any evidence, then you say, ‘Does the evidence that the 
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Commonwealth presented satisfy me beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did 
it.’  That’s all.  Some people think they have to hear everything.  There are some very 
good reasons why people can’t testify.  I’m not going to go into the reasons now, but 
just say he has a Constitutional right.  Everybody has a Constitutional right.  
Therefore, I’m now going to once and again instruct you that it is entirely up to the 
defendant in every criminal case whether or not to testify.  He has an absolute right 
founded on the United States Constitution to remain silent.  You must not draw any 
inference of guilt from the fact that defendant did not testify.  I repeat, no inference of 
guilt or of anything else may be drawn from the fact that the defendant did not testify.  
For any of you to draw such an inference would be wrong.  Indeed, it would be a 
violation of your oath as a juror.” 
3.) The US Court of Appeals: 1st Circuit, Pattern Criminal Jury 
Instructions, 1998: 
“3.03 Defendant’s Constitutional Right Not to Testify.  [Defendant] has a 
constitutional right not to testify and no inference of guilt, or of anything else, may be 
drawn from the fact that [defendant] did not testify. For any of you to draw such an 
inference would be wrong; indeed, it would be a violation of your oath as a juror.” 
4.) The US Court of Appeals: 5th Circuit, Pattern Jury Instructions: 
Criminal: 
“Section 1.05:  …The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence 
or produce any evidence at all [and no inference whatever may be drawn from 
the election 
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of a defendant not to testify]. 
“Section 1.06:  …The defendant did not testify and I remind you that you cannot 
consider his decision not to testify as evidence of guilt.” 
 
5.) The US Court of Appeals: 6th Circuit, Pattern Criminal Jury 
Instructions: 
“7.02A.  Defendant's Failure to Testify.  
(1) A defendant has an absolute right not to testify [or present evidence]. The fact that 
he did not testify [or present any evidence] cannot be considered by you in any way. 
Do not even discuss it in your deliberations.  
(2) Remember that it is up to the government to prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It is not up to the defendant to prove that he is innocent.”  
6.) The US Court of Appeals: 7th Circuit, Pattern Criminal Federal Jury 
Instructions: 
“3.01 FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY.  The [A] defendant has an 
absolute right not to testify. The fact that the [a] defendant did not testify 
should not be considered by you in any way in arriving at your verdict.” 
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7.) The US Court of Appeals: 8th Circuit, Manual of Model Criminal Jury 
Instructions: 
“Section 3.06.   …. There is no burden upon a defendant to prove that he or she is 
innocent. Accordingly, the fact that [a] defendant did not testify must not be 
considered by you in any way, or even discussed, in arriving at your verdict.” 
 
8.) The US Court of Appeals: 9th Circuit, Manual of Model Criminal Jury 
Instructions: 
“3.3 DEFENDANT'S DECISION NOT TO TESTIFY.  A defendant in a criminal case 
has a constitutional right not to testify. No presumption of guilt may be raised, and no 
inference of any kind may be drawn, from the fact that the defendant did not testify.” 
  
9.) The US Court of Appeals:- 11th Circuit, Pattern Jury Instructions 
(Criminal Cases): 
“2.2  … The indictment or formal charge against any Defendant is not evidence of 
guilt. Indeed, every Defendant is presumed by the law to be innocent. The law does 
not require a Defendant to prove innocence or to produce any evidence at all; and if a 
Defendant elects not to testify, you cannot consider that in any way during your 
deliberations. 
The Government has the burden of proving a Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and if it fails to do so you must find that Defendant not guilty.” 
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10.)   The New Jersey: Model Criminal Jury Charges: 
“NON2C.206:  DEFENDANT'S ELECTION NOT TO TESTIFY. 
The defendant in this case chose not to be a witness.  It is the constitutional 
right of a defendant to remain silent.  I charge you that you are not to consider 
for any purpose or in any manner in arriving at your verdict, the fact that the 
defendant did not testify nor should that fact enter into your deliberations or 
discussions in any manner or at any time.  The defendant is entitled to have the 
jury consider all of the evidence and (he/she) is entitled to the presumption of 
innocence even if (he/she) does not testify as a witness.” 
 
11.)   The New York State Criminal Jury Instructions: 
“The fact that the defendant did not testify is not a factor from which any inference 
unfavorable to the defendant may be drawn.” 
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